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PROSECUTORS, ETHICS, AND  
EXPERT WITNESSES 
Paul C. Giannelli* & Kevin C. McMunigal** 
If the prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death 
ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann reported.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the DNA 
exonerations that occurred in the 1990s concern the misconduct of 
prosecutors.  In Actual Innocence,2 Barry Scheck and his colleagues 
examined sixty-two of the first sixty-seven DNA exonerations secured 
through Cardozo Law School’s Innocence Project in order to ascertain what 
factors contributed to erroneous convictions.  Prosecutorial misbehavior 
was found in forty-two percent of the cases.3  Another significant 
contributor to these miscarriages of justice was the misuse of expert 
testimony.  A third of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science.”4  
 
* Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
** Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
 1. Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil:  Discovery of Possibly 
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24, 24 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of 
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:  The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. 
J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 439 (1997) (discussing expert misconduct, including Dr. Ralph Erdmann’s 
cases); see also Roy Bragg, New Clues May Be Dug from Grave; Furor Touches on 
Autopsies, Brains, Houston Chron., Mar. 28, 1992, at 1A (“[C]all him ‘McErdmann,’ . . . .   
He’s like McDonald’s—billions served.’” (quoting Dallam County District Attorney Barry 
Blackwell)); Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial 
Evidence, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1992, at A24 (“[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical 
examiner Linda Norton was quoted as saying [Dr.] Erdmann routinely performs ‘made-to-
order autopsies that support a police version of a story.’”). 
 2. Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence:  Five Days to Execution and Other 
Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 246 (2000).  As of September 2007, there have 
been over 205 DNA exonerations. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2008). 
 3. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246.  The conduct of defense attorneys was also 
found to be less than exemplary. See infra text accompanying notes 229–32. 
 4. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246.  A subsequent review attributed 63% of the 
wrongful convictions to forensic science testing errors and 27% to false or misleading 
testimony by forensic experts. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, Review, The 
Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 Sci. 892, 892 fig.1 (2005).  A 
2005 study identified 24 prosecutions in which forensic scientists committed perjury. Samuel 
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States:  1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 523, 543 (2005).  This study identified 340 exonerations, 196 of which did not 
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This essay examines the intersection of these two factors—the prosecutor’s 
role in using and presenting expert testimony, a topic that is being 
addressed with increasing frequency by commentators.5  The prosecutor’s 
suppression of exculpatory DNA test results in the Duke lacrosse case is but 
one recent illustration of this problem.6 
The prosecutorial misconduct revealed in the exoneration cases, however, 
is not a new phenomenon.  Older cases reveal similar misconduct, 
suggesting that the problem is systemic rather than episodic.  Prosecutorial 
misconduct in the use of scientific evidence is significant because of the 
increasingly important role that scientific evidence plays in the criminal 
justice system.  One study found that approximately “one quarter of the 
citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific 
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have 
changed their verdicts—from guilty to not guilty.”7  This research was 
published before the use of DNA evidence became widespread8 and prior to 
 
involve DNA evidence. Id. at 524.  The most recent study of 200 DNA exonerations found 
that expert testimony (present in 55% of the cases) was the second leading type of evidence 
(after eyewitness identifications, 79% of cases) used in the wrongful conviction cases. 
Garrett, supra note 2. 
 5. A number of commentators examine the issue. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, 
Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 17, 17 (2003) (“The 
prosecutor’s misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict has not been sufficiently 
examined.”); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of 
Justice, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2007) (“To date, the legal system and commentators have 
paid little attention to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert testimony—
despite mounting evidence that misconvictions have been based upon unreliable expert 
testimony.”); Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 
49 Clev. St. L. Rev. 421, 421 (2001) (“What are the legal and ethical responsibilities of 
attorneys when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Some commentators have considered the ethical issues that arise in the use of experts in 
civil litigation. See Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses:  Ethics and Professionalism, 12 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 465, 466 (1999); Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 
1539 (2007); Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science—The Lawyer’s Ethical Responsibilities, 25 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 449 (1998); Justin P. Murphy, Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial:  Where 
Are the Ethics?, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217 (2000). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
 7. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the 
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. Forensic Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987); see also Scott Bales, 
Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, Litig., Winter 2000, at 51, 51 
(commenting that “prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges agree that scientific evidence 
can powerfully affect—and often determine—the outcome in criminal cases”). 
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, “Scientific issues permeate the law.  Criminal courts 
consider the scientific validity of, say, DNA sampling or voice prints, or expert predictions 
of defendants’ ‘future dangerousness,’ which can lead courts or juries to authorize or 
withhold the punishment of death.” Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, Issues in Sci. 
& Tech., Summer 2000, at 52, 53.  According to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, “Hardly a case of 
importance is tried today in the federal courts without the involvement of a number of expert 
witnesses.” Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 473 
(1986). 
 8. In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England, recognized the 
utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases.  Its first use in American courts came the 
following year. See Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Congress, Genetic Witness:  Forensic 
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the avalanche of television programs on forensic science creating what has 
come to be known as the “CSI effect.”9 
Once a prosecutor determines to employ an expert, a number of distinct 
decisions must be confronted—from choosing the expert, to complying 
with discovery obligations, to presenting the testimony at trial.  Part I of this 
essay considers the selection of experts.  Although improper selection of 
experts can be viewed as merely another aspect of presenting misleading 
testimony, we treat it separately in this essay because the literature typically 
ignores it.  Part II examines the pretrial disclosure of scientific evidence.  
The issues that have arisen in this context include late disclosure, omitting 
information from laboratory reports, declining to have a report prepared, 
and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.  Part III explores a number of 
ways in which prosecutors have presented expert testimony in a misleading 
manner.  What practices should be considered “misleading” is far from 
obvious.  In Part IV, we take a broader view and consider reforms that have 
relevance across a range of issues. 
I.  EXPERT SELECTION 
At times, prosecutors are not involved in choosing expert witnesses.  In a 
routine drug case, for example, the police may submit a substance suspected 
of containing cocaine for testing by a chemist employed by the police 
without any notification to or input from the prosecutor who may eventually 
try the case.  However, if the results of scientific testing are likely to be 
contested, the prosecutor may become quite involved and exercise 
considerable power and control in the selection of an expert witness.  Such 
power may be exercised appropriately.  For example, if fingerprints are a 
critical piece of evidence, a prosecutor might seek to obtain the most 
competent expert available.  But such power may also be exercised 
inappropriately by seeking out an expert based on the expert’s willingness 
to support the prosecution’s theory of the case regardless of the soundness 
of the expert’s view.  This latter practice, which we refer to as “shopping” 
for an expert, can result in the presentation of misleading evidence to a jury. 
A.  Louise Robbins 
One of the U.S. Supreme Court’s prosecutorial immunity cases, Buckley 
v. Fitzsimmons,10 offers an illustration of how testimony can be skewed by 
 
Uses of DNA Tests 8 (1990) [hereinafter OTA Report].  The first appellate case, was 
reported in 1988. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
DNA evidence admissible).  By January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted 
into evidence “in at least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA Report, supra, 
at 14. 
 9. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt:  Managing 
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 Yale L.J. 1050 (2006) (noting the uncertainty 
of the phenomenon); Michael Mann, Comment, The “CSI Effect”:  Better Jurors Through 
Television and Science?, 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 211 (2006). 
 10. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
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the selection process.  In 1983, Stephen Buckley, along with Rolando Cruz 
and Alejandro Hernandez, was indicted for a highly publicized Illinois 
murder.  The critical evidence was a boot print left by the killer on the door 
of the eleven-year-old victim’s home when the killer kicked it in.11  Experts 
from the county and state crime labs, as well as from the Kansas Bureau of 
Identification, were unable to identify Buckley’s boot as the source of the 
print.12  Ignoring these government experts, prosecutors shopped for a 
“positive identification” from Dr. Louise Robbins, a controversial expert.13 
A detective, who resigned because he believed the wrong people had 
been charged, stated it this way, 
The first lab guy says it’s not the boot . . . .  We don’t like that answer, so 
there’s no paper [report].  We go to a second guy who used to do our lab.  
He says yes.  So we write a report on Mr. Yes.  Then Louise Robbins 
arrives.  This is the boot, she says.  That’ll be $10,000.  So now we have 
evidence.14 
Buckley’s trial ended in a hung jury.  His codefendants, however, were 
convicted but later freed due to DNA analysis.15  Indeed, an appellate 
prosecutor, like the detective mentioned earlier, resigned in protest,16 and 
the district attorneys were subsequently tried (but acquitted) for their 
conduct in prosecuting the codefendants.17  DNA evidence later exonerated 
Buckley.18 
 
 11. Id. at 262. 
 12. See id. (“After three separate studies by experts from the Du Page County Crime 
Lab, the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, and the Kansas Bureau of Identification, 
all of whom were unable to make a reliable connection between the print and a pair of boots 
that petitioner had voluntarily supplied, respondents obtained a ‘positive identification’ from 
one Louise Robbins, an anthropologist in North Carolina who was allegedly well known for 
her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony.”). 
 13. See id. at 272 (holding that “prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for the 
claim that they conspired to manufacture false evidence that would link [Buckley’s] boot 
with the bootprint the murderer left on the front door.  To obtain this false evidence, 
petitioner submits, the prosecutors shopped for experts until they found one who would 
provide the opinion they sought.”); Giannelli, supra note 1, at 457–58 (discussing Robbins). 
 14. Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty:  An Illinois Murder Case Became a Test of 
Conscience Inside the System, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1992, (Magazine), at 19 (quoting former 
detective John Sam). 
 15. Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science:  Case Studies in 
the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial 44–46 (1996) (discussing the 
cases of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez). 
 16. Siegel, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing the resignation of attorney Mary Brigid 
Kenney). 
 17. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 176–80; see also Pam Belluck, Officials Face 
Trial in an Alleged Plot to Frame a Man for Murder, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1999, at A19 (“In 
a case being closely watched by lawyers and investigators, a group of seven prosecutors and 
sheriff’s deputies will go on trial on Tuesday, charged with conspiring to frame an innocent 
man.”); Eric Herman, Conspiracy Theory, Am. Law., Mar. 1998, at 75 (discussing the 
prosecution of the prosecutors and police officers involved in the alleged conspiracy before 
their trial). 
 18. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 644 (Ill. 1994) (“Seminal fluid recovered from 
the victim’s body was DNA tested, excluding both of defendant’s previous codefendants 
Alex Hernandez and Steven Buckley as possible sources, but not defendant or Brian Dugan, 
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When experts disagree, at what point is the prosecutor on notice that a 
serious problem might exist, thereby triggering an obligation to investigate 
further?  What if an expert always says what the prosecutor wants to hear?  
Such questions were particularly relevant in the Buckley case; Robbins was 
at the center of controversy prior to being retained.19  As her moniker, the 
“Cinderella” expert, suggests, she claimed abilities that no one else had.20 
That alone should have given the prosecutor pause—especially after 
three other government experts could not support her conclusion.  
Moreover, the prosecutor announced Buckley’s indictment shortly before a 
tightly contested primary election. 
B.  Fred Zain 
In West Virginia, the former head serologist of the state police crime 
laboratory, Trooper Fred Zain, falsified test results in as many as 133 cases 
from 1979 to 1989.21  A team of outside forensic scientists found that 
“when in doubt, Zain’s findings would always inculpate the suspect.”22  
After Zain accepted a position in the San Antonio crime lab, West Virginia 
prosecutors sent evidence to him for retesting because the West Virginia 
serologists apparently could not reach the “right” results.  For example, one 
serologist “testified that at least twice after Zain left the lab, evidence on 
which [the serologist] had been unable to obtain genetic markers was 
subsequently sent to Texas for testing by Zain, who again was able to 
identify genetic markers.”23  His replacement as director of serology would 
 
an individual convicted of several other sexual assaults and murders of young females, who 
indicated he alone killed Jeanine Nicarico.”). 
 19. See Thomas Frisbie, Prosecution Tactics Drew Critics from the Beginning, Chi. Sun-
Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at 24 (“[P]rosecutors used the testimony of Louise Robbins, who used 
a scientifically unverified method of matching shoeprints to shoes through a ‘wear pattern.’  
Robbins said her method showed Buckley kicked in the [victim’s] front door, even though 
the pattern on the bottom of Buckley’s shoes differed from the one on the door.”). 
 20. See People v. Puluti, 174 Cal. Rptr. 597, 603 (Ct. App. 1981) (Robbins “had never 
before been qualified as an expert to testify about foot imprints left inside of shoes for 
purposes of identification” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Barker, 170 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct. 
App. 1980) (“She considered herself the chief proponent of the ‘unique shoeprint’ concept, 
in that she was the only person presently working on this subject.”); Mark Hansen, Believe It 
or Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64, 65 (“But Robbins was alone in claiming that she could 
tell whether a person made a particular print by examining any other shoes belonging to that 
individual.”); Vicki Quade, If the Shoe Fits:  Footprint Expert Testifies, A.B.A. J., July 
1984, at 34, 34 (“By analyzing the soles of a shoe, . . . she can determine whether a specific 
person wore the shoes, based on impressions and wear patterns made by the bones of the 
foot.”). 
 21. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 510 & n.4 (W. Va. 1993). 
 22. Id. at 512 n.9.  The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors provided the 
team. Id. 
 23. Id. at 512.  Other examiners had similar experiences.  “[Serologist Howard Brent] 
Myers also testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a murder suspect’s jacket, 
it was sent to Texas, where [Fred] Zain found a bloodstain which tested consistent with the 
blood of the victim.” Id.  According to Zain’s replacement, “several prosecutors expressed 
dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving from serology and specifically requested 
that the evidence be analyzed by Zain.” Id. at 512 n.16. 
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later describe Zain as “very pro-prosecution.”24  Apparently, no prosecutor 
ever questioned Zain’s methods or results during his “long history of 
falsifying evidence in criminal prosecutions.”25  In a 60 Minutes interview, 
a prosecutor excused his colleagues by saying that they thought that they 
had a “world class” expert.26  Why prosecutors would believe that Zain, but 
not his coworkers, was a “world class” expert is not clear.  Sending 
evidence to Zain in Texas after receiving results that did not support their 
case belies the notion that these prosecutors did not have notice of the 
problem. 
C.  Joyce Gilchrist 
Joyce Gilchrist, a forensic chemist in the Oklahoma City Police 
Department crime laboratory, provides another illustration of prosecutors 
recklessly or knowingly selecting a corrupt expert.27  Gilchrist started 
working for the lab in 1980.  It was not long before she became enmeshed 
in controversy.  An expert from another government lab filed an ethics 
complaint against her with the Southwestern Association of Forensic 
Scientists, which conducted an investigation and concluded that Gilchrist 
had failed to distinguish between her personal and scientific opinions.28 
In 1988, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, reversing a criminal 
conviction, found that Gilchrist had “inexcusabl[y]” delayed sending her 
laboratory report as well as an evidence sample to a defense expert.29  The 
 
 24. Id. at 514 n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Id. at 503. 
 26. 60 Minutes:  Right On, Fred Zain (CBS television broadcast Apr. 24, 1994). 
 27. See Mark Fuhrman, Death and Justice:  An Exposé of Oklahoma’s Death Row 
Machine 232 (2003) (“[Joyce Gilchrist] appears to have used her lab tests to confirm the 
detectives’ hunches rather than seek independent scientific results.  She also tried to control 
the results of her tests . . . .  She treated discovery requests with contempt and kept evidence 
from the defense.  She systematically destroyed evidence at the very time when she knew 
that much of that evidence might be retested.”). 
 28. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).  In that case, 
the court observed, 
. . . [O]n December 14, 1987, Max Courtney, President of the Southwestern 
Association of Forensic Scientists, Inc., issued a prepared statement of the Board 
of Directors concerning allegations of professional misconduct lodged against Ms. 
Gilchrist.  A certified copy of this statement, which was filed with this Court on 
January 4, 1988, concluded that Ms. Gilchrist had violated the ethical code, but 
interestingly she was not disciplined.  That statement reads in relevant part:  “Our 
Professional Conduct Committee thoroughly investigated the allegations against 
Ms. Joyce Gilchrist and . . . communicated with [her] that she should distinguish 
personal opinion from opinions based upon facts derived from scientific  
evaluation . . . .  We further conclude that, in our system of jurisprudence, undue 
pressure can be placed upon the forensic scientist to offer personal opinions 
beyond the scope of scientific capabilities.” 
Id. 
 29. Id. at 1217 (“Ms. Gilchrist’s delay and neglect in not completing her forensic 
examination and report . . . was inexcusable, since she began her forensic examination in 
December of 1982.”).  In subsequent litigation, the court wrote, “[F]ollowing our decision in 
Petitioner’s first trial, it can be safely said that the entire legal community was on notice that 
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court also criticized Gilchrist for omitting critical information from the 
report, labeling her conduct “trial by ambush.”30  Finally, the same court 
found that Gilchrist had testified beyond the state of the art.31  A year later, 
the court questioned her testimony concerning hair analysis in Fox v. 
State,32 a death penalty case, finding that she had overstated her conclusions 
at trial.33 
The following year, in Pierce v. State,34 the court addressed Gilchrist’s 
conduct one more time.  Here, again, she violated a court discovery order 
by failing to turn over evidence to the defense and wrote an incomplete 
report.35  As before, the court used forceful language:  “Instead of following 
either the letter of the Order or taking steps to have the Order changed or 
clarified by the court, she took it upon herself to determine the portions of 
the Order with which she wished to comply.  This was not her decision to 
make.”36  Although the conviction was upheld, Pierce was later exonerated 
by DNA37 and sued Gilchrist for violating his constitutional rights.38 
 
this Court was not particularly impressed with Ms. Gilchrist’s hair comparison techniques 
and unscientific opinions in relation to Petitioner.” McCarty v. State, 114 P.3d 1089, 1093 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2005). 
 30. McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1218 (“[T]he forensic report was at best incomplete, and at 
worst inaccurate and misleading. . . . Gilchrist admitted at trial, however, that she failed to 
include her conclusion . . . in the forensic report given to Mr. Wilson.  This significant 
omission, whether intentional or inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 31. Id. (“We find it inconceivable why Ms. Gilchrist would give such an improper 
opinion, which she admitted she was not qualified to give.”). 
 32. 779 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (upholding a murder conviction and the death 
penalty). 
 33. See id. at 571 (“The lack of scientific weight of such a conclusion is apparent on 
reflection by those dealing with similar evidence on a regular basis.  But to a lay jury, 
usually ill-equipped to assimilate hair analysis findings on their own, such an opinion may 
appear too substantial.”); id. (“Ms. Gilchrist admitted that an individual could not be 
positively identified by hair evidence.  However, she went on to testify that, ‘[in] her 
opinion . . . Mark Fowler and Bill Fox were in contact with John Barrier prior to death.’”). 
 34. 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). 
 35. Id. at 1263 n.8 (“Specifically, Appellant claims that it was error for Gilchrist not to 
set out in the report, her opinion that the attacker was a non-secretor.”).  At trial, Gilchrist 
testified that Jeffrey Todd Pierce was a nonsecretor, a person whose blood type cannot be 
determined through other body fluids, including semen.  Twenty percent of the population 
falls into this category. 1 Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 
17.09, at 959 (4th ed. 2007). 
 36. Id. at 1261. 
 37. A later Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) examination of Gilchrist’s analyses in 
eight cases determined that she had misidentified hairs in six and fibers in another. See FBI, 
Summary of Case Reviews of Forensic Chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, Oklahoma City Police 
Department Crime Laboratory 1 (2001) (“The review of the laboratory notes revealed that 
they were often incomplete or inadequate to support the conclusions reached by the 
examiner.  No documentation existed that would allow the examiner to identify textile fibers 
associated in one of the cases.  No notations were present that would indicate a confirmation 
or review by another qualified examiner was undertaken, especially in the cases where hair 
evidence linked the suspect and victim.”).  One of the cases was Pierce’s; the FBI found that 
none of the hairs taken from Pierce exhibited the same microscopic characteristics as those 
found at the crime scene. Id. at 3 (“[T]hese [pubic] hairs do not exhibit the same microscopic 
characteristics as the suspect’s known pubic hairs.”).  As a result, the Oklahoma City Police 
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In the same year, the court reversed another rape conviction in which 
Gilchrist had testified, Miller v. State,39 noting that Gilchrist had turned 
over hair evidence to the defense in an untimely manner40 and had omitted 
crucial conclusions from her report.41  Mitochondrial DNA later exonerated 
Miller.42  Another suspect, Ronnie Lott, whom Gilchrist had cleared, was 
eventually convicted of the crime.43  By this time, Gilchrist was so 
notorious that Professor James E. Starrs critiqued her work in a forensic 
science journal.  He wrote, “[I]n her missionary zeal to promote the cause 
of the prosecution she had put blinders on her professional conscience so 
that the truth of science took a back seat to her acting the role of an 
advocate.”44 
Having been publicly rebuked in several judicial opinions and attacked 
by other forensic scientists, one would expect that her career as an expert 
either would be over or at least in jeopardy.  Yet, despite this notoriety, she 
worked for another decade, even receiving commendations and promotions.  
A subsequent supervisor later wrote, 
I knew from previous articles published over the years that she had been 
the subject of scrutiny by the courts, but I assumed they had been 
addressed by the department and resolved.  I later found no indication in 
her personnel file that they had ever been investigated or addressed 
administratively.45 
Known as “Black Magic,” she continued to be a prosecution superstar.46 
 
Department had the evidence retested by a private DNA laboratory.  DNA testing was not 
available at the time of Pierce’s trial in 1986. 
 38. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that Gilchrist 
does not have immunity). 
 39. 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). 
 40. Id. at 1320 (“What is even more disturbing . . . is the fact that Ms. Gilchrist’s pretrial 
forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a ‘unique characteristic’ 
concerning appellant’s pubic hairs.  However, in his opening argument, the prosecutor 
alerted the jury to the State’s expert’s finding of the ‘unique characteristic.’  Clearly, this 
significant omission in Ms. Gilchrist’s report, whether intentional or inadvertent, coupled 
with the State’s extreme tardiness in complying with the discovery order, resulted in trial by 
ambush on a very critical piece of evidence.”). 
 41. Id. at 1319–20 (“[I]t was approximately two weeks after the deadline ordered by 
Judge Owens that Ms. Gilchrist mailed the hair evidence to the appellant’s expert.  Thus, 
appellant’s expert received the evidence six and one-half days before trial began.”). 
 42. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 87. 
 43. Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
 44. James E. Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. Forensic Sci. Soc’y 
111, 132–33 (1991). 
 45. Memorandum from Captain Byron Boshell, Lab. Servs., to Major Garold Spencer, 
Investigations Bureau (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with author). 
 46. See also Fuhrman, supra note 27, at 71.  Detective Bob Bemo claims that Gilchrist 
began giving the detectives test results that were so good “that he didn’t believe [she] was 
doing proper lab work, because her results were ‘too good.’  Bemo says that now, but it 
didn’t stop him and his partner Bill Cook from using Gilchrist’s lab results in many of their 
cases.” Id.  “Homicide detective Bill Cook had given Gilchrist the nickname ‘Black Magic’ 
because she was able to get results that no other chemist could.  When Cook and other 
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Given the many signals that her testimony was corrupt, prosecutors 
should have stopped using her as a witness.47  When interviewed by Dan 
Rather in 2001, John Wilson, the expert who filed the ethics complaint 
against her, provided this perspective:  “The whole criminal justice system 
has failed.”48  He then elaborated, “[Y]ou have to look at the prosecutor’s 
office, that they had to understand what’s been going on.  They had to have 
seen all the flags that’s been waved.”  At the same time, the former chief of 
police said, “[T]he district attorney’s office loved having her as a 
witness.”49 
D.  Michael West 
1.  The Early Years 
Dr. Michael West, a Mississippi dentist, became infamous in the early 
1990s.  An article in The National Law Journal about him was entitled 
“Expert” Science Under Fire in Capital Cases.50  Two years later The ABA 
Journal noted that “West’s self-proclaimed forensic abilities . . . have long 
been questioned by many of his peers.”51  In 1992, West matched a bite 
mark found on a rape victim with the teeth of Jonny Bourn, making a 
positive identification.  DNA analysis of skin taken from fingernail 
scrapings of the victim conclusively excluded Bourn.52 
Although he testified most often as a forensic dentist, West did not 
restrict himself to bite mark identifications.  He testified about tool marks, 
shoeprints, fingernail comparisons, knife wound comparisons, and other 
issues seemingly beyond his expertise.53  In other cases, West identified a 
 
homicide detectives gave Gilchrist hair samples from a suspect, they would often let her 
know that this was the person they wanted to arrest.” Id. at 91. 
 47. See id. at 223 (“If [Gilchrist] were simply incompetent, her mistakes would have 
been all over the map.  Instead, her mistakes benefited the prosecution.”). 
 48. 60 Minutes:  Under the Microscope:  Forensics Scientist Joyce Gilchrist’s Lab Work 
Is Under Scrutiny (CBS television broadcast May 8, 2001). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Marcia Coyle, “Expert” Science Under Fire in Capital Cases, Nat’l L.J., July 11, 
1994, at A1. 
 51. Mark Hansen, Out of the Blue, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 50, 50–51.  Dr. Michael West 
estimates that he has testified about fifty-five times over the past decade.  A third of these 
cases were capital prosecutions and he has only “lost” one case. Id.  One of the authors also 
wrote about him. See Giannelli, supra note 1; Paul C. Giannelli, Op-Ed., When the Evidence 
Is a Matter of Life and Death, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1994, at E15. 
 52. Hansen, supra note 51, at 53. 
 53. “West’s proclaimed expertise is not limited to bite marks.  In fact, he has created a 
comfy niche, mostly as a prosecution expert, matching not only bite marks with teeth, but 
also wounds with weapons, shoes with footprints and fingernails with scratches, even spills 
with stains.” Hansen, supra note 51, at 51; see Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 800–01 
(Miss. 2003) (“During a hearing, Dr. West stated that he has testified seventy-five times . . . 
forty-one murder trials; thirty-two times as a wound pattern expert; one time as a trace metal 
expert; three times as an expert regarding gun shot residue; three times as an expert in 
gunshot reconstruction; three times as a death investigator expert; two times as a County 
Coroner; six times in child abuse trials; three times as a crime scene investigator; and one 
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footprint on a murdered girl’s face, matched a bruise on a murder victim’s 
stomach with a hiking boot belonging to the defendant,54 and testified as a 
burn pattern specialist.55  In one of these cases, the court even referred to 
him as a “controversial ‘wound pattern analyst,’”56 a well-deserved label 
because it is not clear that West or anyone else could do what he claimed to 
do. 
In case after case, West testified with certainty.  He repeatedly stated his 
opinion with the phrase “indeed and without doubt.”57  In addition, West 
used alternate light imaging (which he somewhat immodestly called the 
“West Phenomenon”) to detect and analyze wounds.58  He testified that this 
phenomenon, which he was inexplicably unable to photograph, was a 
generally accepted scientific technique.  Nevertheless, the three experts who 
West claimed used his procedure later testified that this was not so.  In still 
another capital murder case, West made a bite mark identification after 
exhuming the corpse fourteen months after death.  Once again, he used his 
blue light (“West Phenomenon”) technique to visualize the wound, which 
he then matched to the defendant’s teeth.  The skin tissue surrounding the 
mark was removed and placed in a preservative.  Two weeks later, 
 
time as a blood splatter expert.  He also asserts that he has made 600 dental I.D.’s and 300 
bite mark I.D.’s.”). 
 54. See State v. Van Winkle, 658 So. 2d 198, 200 (La. 1995) (conviction overturned) 
(“Other forensic evidence was provided by Dr. West, a dentist and controversial ‘wound 
pattern analyst’ from Hattiesburg, Mississippi.  He testified that markings on Patrick’s 
stomach were consistent with the soles of tennis shoe hiking boots seized from Patricia’s 
bedroom.  A defense expert, Dr. Singer, contested this, finding there was no reasonable 
correlation between Patrick’s bruise pattern and the boot in Patricia’s room.”). 
 55. Hansen, supra note 51, at 53; see also Davis v. State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 
1992).  “[West] concluded that the wound was a bite mark consistent with having been 
inflicted approximately three weeks previously.” Id.  Dr. Richard Souviron, a forensic 
odontologist from Miami, Florida, “testified that the wound on Davis’ arm was not a bite 
mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Mrs. Davis’ teeth.” Id. 
 56. Van Winkle, 658 So. 2d at 200. 
 57. In State v. Maxwell, a capital murder case, West testified that a butcher knife blade 
“indeed and without doubt” caused skin wounds on two victims and a slash mark on a door.  
Moreover, the broken handle of the knife “indeed and without doubt” caused bruises on the 
accused’s hand.  This testimony was virtually the only evidence connecting Maxwell to the 
murders. See State v. Maxwell, No. 5139 (Miss. Cir. Ct. dismissed Apr. 24, 1992).  In 
another capital case, State v. Oppie, West conducted a fingernail/scratch mark comparison, 
reporting that “indeed and without doubt” the scratches on the accused were made by the 
victim’s fingernails. State v. Oppie, No. 90-10,600(3) (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1990).  He 
acknowledged, however, that he had failed to (1) make test marks with the fingernail, (2) 
evaluate its class and individual characteristics, and (3) establish the reproducibility of such 
marks. Am. Acad. of Forensic Sciences Ethics Comm., Case No. 143, at 2 (1994) 
[hereinafter AAFS Comm.]. 
 58. West used long wave ultraviolet blue light to visualize this phenomenon on the 
defendant’s hands ten days after the murders.  The knife had a wooden handle, one side of 
which was missing and thus exposing three rivets. 
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however, the preservative had erased the mark.59  The conviction was later 
overturned.60 
An ethics committee of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
concluded that West had “misrepresented data in order to support his 
testimony” and that the term “indeed and without doubt” was 
unwarranted.61  Similarly, an ethics committee of the American Board of 
Forensic Odontologists concluded that West had “materially misrepresented 
the evidence and data.”62  It also concluded that the “West Phenomenon” 
was not “founded on scientific principles” and that West had presented 
testimony “outside the field of forensic odontology.”63  Finally, the Crime 
Scene Certification Board of the International Association of Identification 
concluded (but only by a majority) that there was a basis for the complaint 
and provided West with an opportunity to relinquish his “Senior Crime 
Scene Analyst” certification.64 
2.  The Later Years 
At this point, one might have thought that West would have faded into 
legal obscurity.  Not at all.  In Banks v. State,65 a 1997 capital murder case, 
West testified as a prosecution witness, matching the accused’s teeth with 
the bite marks in the remaining portion of a bologna sandwich found at the 
crime scene.  A defense expert was compelled to use photographs of the 
sandwich because the sandwich was destroyed.  Consequently, he was 
unable to reach any definite conclusions.66  Reversing the conviction, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court wrote that “the prejudicial impact of the State’s 
destruction of the sandwich on the persuasive value of Banks’ case is 
 
 59. Coyle, supra note 50 (referring to Edward J. Castain, who represented Anthony 
Keko, for the murder of his estranged wife). 
 60. See Keko v. Hingle, No. Civ. A. 98-2189, 1999 WL 508406, at *1 (E.D. La. July 8, 
1999) (“After serving two years and one month of his sentence, Keko was released from jail 
and granted a new trial based on the court’s determination that the prosecution had withheld 
information regarding the qualifications of its chief witness, Dr. West. . . . On January 13, 
1998, the State dismissed all charges against Keko.  Keko filed the present action on July 27, 
1998.”), aff’d, 318 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting West’s claim of absolute immunity for 
his pretrial conduct in Keko’s prosecution). 
 61. AAFS Comm., supra note 57, at 3.  The committee recommended that West, a 
fellow in the odontology section, be expelled. See also Steven C. Batterman, President, Am. 
Acad. of Forensic Sciences, Letter to the Editor, AAFS Did Not Deny Due Process to Dr. 
West, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at A20. 
 62. Am. Bd. of Forensic Odontology Ethics Comm., Complaint 93-B (1994). 
 63. Id.  The committee recommended a one-year suspension, which was accepted by the 
American Board of Forensic Odontology Board of Directors on May 18, 1994.  West 
appealed this decision.  The appeal was denied. 
 64. When informed of this development, West resigned.  Letter from Kenneth B. Zercie, 
Chairman, Crime Scene Certification Bd., to John Holdridge, Att’y, Capital Trial Assistance 
Project (Aug. 16, 1993) (on file with author). 
 65. 725 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 1997). 
 66. See id. at 713–14. 
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plainly apparent, and West’s destruction of the sandwich was unnecessary 
and inexcusable.”67 
In Brooks v. State,68 a subsequent case decided in 1999, the Court upheld 
the use of West’s bite mark testimony, acknowledging, however, the need 
for defense experts in bite mark cases.69  A blistering dissent pointed out 
that there were only two linear marks on the victim and the defense expert 
could not say that they were even bite marks.  Moreover, the dissent 
commented on West’s proclivity “to boldly go where no expert has gone 
before,”70 to lose evidence,71 and to create new fields of expertise.72  The 
dissent concluded, “This Court’s apparent willingness to allow West to 
testify to anything and everything so long as the defense is permitted to 
cross-examine him may be expedient for prosecutors but it is harmful to the 
criminal justice system.”73 
In 2001, an enterprising attorney, who had represented a defendant 
convicted on bite mark evidence but later exonerated with DNA evidence, 
decided to give West a blind proficiency test.74  Using a ruse, he hired West 
to compare the bite mark in a prior murder case (photographed at the time 
of autopsy) with dental models supplied by a foil.  In West’s videotaped 
report, he concluded, “Finding this many patterns on this injury, I believe, 
 
 67. Id. at 716. 
 68. 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999). 
 69. “If expert testimony regarding bite-mark evidence is allowed by the trial court, the 
defense should be given the opportunity to present evidence that challenges the reliability of 
bite-mark comparisons . . . .” Id. at 739. 
 70. Id. at 748 (“In Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 897 (Miss. 1994), West testified 
that the victim’s body was covered in teeth marks inflicted by the defendant.  On appeal, Dr. 
Mincer gave an affidavit to the effect that the marks appeared to be ant bites.  In Davis v. 
State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 1992), West concluded that ‘the wound was a bite mark 
consistent with having been inflicted approximately three weeks previously.’  But Dr. 
Richard Souviron, a forensic odontologist from Miami, Florida, ‘testified that the wound on 
Davis’ arm was not a bite mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Mrs. Davis’ 
teeth.’”). 
 71. Id. at 750 (“West seems to have difficulty in keeping up with evidence.  In the 
instant case, he lost the [sic] not only the mold to Brooks’s lower teeth but also the mold of 
another suspect’s teeth.  In [Banks], this Court was forced to reverse where West testified 
that the defendant’s teeth correlated to marks in a sandwich left at the crime scene but failed 
to preserve the sandwich so that the defense could make its own comparisons.”). 
 72. Id. at 750 n.4 (“A Westlaw search reveals that Michael West is apparently the only 
person testifying about the ‘science’ of ‘wound pattern analysis.’”). 
 73. Id. at 750 (citation omitted). 
 74. The attorney, Christopher J. Plourd, represented Ray Krone, who had been convicted 
of capital murder and sentenced to death based on the testimony of a forensic dentist.  In 
State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 622–23 (Ariz. 1995), two experienced experts concluded that 
the defendant had made the bite mark found on a murder victim:  “The bite marks were 
crucial to the State’s case because there was very little other evidence to suggest Krone’s 
guilt.” Id. at 622.  The defendant, however, was later exonerated through DNA testing. See 
Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, A.B.A. J., July 2005, at 48, 49–50 
(discussing Krone). 
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can only lead an odontologist to one opinion that these teeth did create that 
mark.”75  He was wrong; DNA had already identified the biter. 
In 2002, West made his television debut on 60 Minutes.  The interviewer 
noted that “no practitioner [was] more suspect” than West and that West 
could find evidence everyone else had missed.76  The next year, in Howard 
v. State,77 the Mississippi Supreme Court once again upheld the 
admissibility of West’s bite mark comparison.  Once again, a dissenting 
opinion vigorously disagreed, calling his testimony “junk science”78 and 
noting that of the 100 board certified forensic odontologists in the United 
States “about 90% of them have testified for the opposite side when Dr. 
West is called as an expert witness.”79  By this time, even the majority of 
the Court was having qualms.  In Stubbs v. State,80 they wrote, 
. . . [W]e in no way implied that Dr. Michael West was given carte 
blanche to testify to anything and everything he so desired. . . . We 
caution prosecutors and defense attorneys, as well as our learned trial 
judges, to take care that Dr. West’s testimony as an expert is confined to 
the area of his expertise . . . .81 
Despite the controversy, prosecutors continue to use West.  Why?  
“[S]ome prosecutors are too willing to turn to somebody like West when 
they lack the evidence they believe they need to tie a suspect to a crime.”82  
Yet one prosecutor believes that West is merely ahead of his time:  “‘I’m 
quite confident in the guy, . . . I have a lot of faith in him.  And I think he 
makes one heck of a witness.’”83  Indeed and without doubt. 
At present, West is preparing to testify in the retrial of Kennedy 
Brewer,84 who was granted a new trial because DNA analysis of the murder 
victim’s vaginal swab had eliminated him as the source of semen.  West has 
made a positive identification and is once again prepared to express his 
unqualified opinion at the retrial.85  The question remains:  why would a 
 
 75. Affidavit of Christopher J. Plourd at 5, State v. Brewer, No. 5999 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 15, 2005) (quoting West’s video report) (affidavit and video report on file with author).  
West also stated, “I feel very confident that there are enough points of unique individual 
characteristics in this study model to say that these teeth inflicted this bite mark.” Id. 
 76. 60 Minutes:  Forensic Evidence:  Skepticism Surrounding Dr. Michael West’s Use of 
Bite Mark Analysis in Murder Cases (CBS television broadcast Feb. 17, 2002) [hereinafter 
60 Minutes:  Forensic Evidence]. 
 77. 853 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 799. 
 79. Id. at 801. 
 80. 845 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 670. 
 82. Hansen, supra note 51, at 51–52. 
 83. Id. at 54 (quoting James Maxwell, Assistant District Attorney, Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana). 
 84. See Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998). 
 85. See Shaila Dewan, Despite DNA Test, Prosecutor Is Retrying Rape-Murder Case, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2007, at A1 (“The state’s star witness was Dr. Michael West . . . who 
had become a controversial expert in the identification of bite marks.  Dr. West’s findings 
have been contradicted by DNA evidence in at least two other cases.”); 60 Minutes:  
Forensic Evidence, supra note 76. 
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prosecutor call him as a witness at this point?  As Newsweek noted in 2001, 
“West has been saving tough cases for police and prosecutors for more than 
15 years—a much-sought-after clutch witness who, by testifying in 71 trials 
in nine states, has helped send dozens of defendants away.”86 
The reckless use of a tainted expert should be considered a due process 
violation.  An analogy to a prosecutor’s obligation to determine whether an 
expert is testifying truthfully concerning his credentials is instructive.  
People v. Cornille87 involved a prosecution expert who turned out to be an 
imposter and had testified falsely about his qualifications.88  The Illinois 
Supreme Court found a due process violation, commenting, 
 . . . [U]nder certain circumstances the prosecutor should not be 
permitted to avoid responsibility for the false testimony of a government 
witness by failing to examine readily available information that would 
establish that the witness is lying.  It would have been a simple procedure 
in this case for the State to have verified Michaelson’s qualifications 
before he testified at Cornille’s trial.  As a direct result of its failure to do 
so, false testimony occurred at the trial, and a fraud was perpetrated on the 
court and on the defendant.89 
A similar due process obligation should extend to the content of an expert’s 
testimony, especially one with a checkered history.90 
 
 86. Andrew Murr, A Dentist Takes the Stand, Newsweek, Aug. 20, 2001, at 24.  “But his 
performance as an expert witness has long been controversial.  Defense lawyers call him a 
‘snake-oil salesman’ peddling ‘junk science’ to credulous judges and juries.” Id. 
 87. 448 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. 1983). 
 88. Id. at 862 (“In fact, the transcripts show that Michaelson had a record of extremely 
low scholarship; that he had been suspended on several occasions for his lack of academic 
diligence; and that he had not received an academic degree from any of the schools.”). 
 89. Id. at 865; see also id. at 865–66 (“Moreover, it is obvious that every party, 
including the State, has an obligation to verify the credentials of its expert witnesses.  It is 
only on the basis of these credentials that experts are permitted to offer their professional 
opinions concerning the factual issues disputed in the criminal proceeding.  This type of 
purportedly objective opinion testimony may have considerable influence on the jury, and 
the rules for qualifying expert witnesses are designed to ensure that only genuine experts will 
offer it.”). 
 90. In Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 807 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 424 
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970), the court held that reckless use of highly suspicious false testimony 
violates due process. 
Due process of law does not tolerate a prosecutor’s selective inattention to such 
significant facts. . . . It imposes as well an affirmative duty to avoid even 
unintentional deception and misrepresentation, and in fulfilling that duty the 
prosecutor must undertake careful study of his case and exercise diligence in its 
preparation, particularly where he is confronted with facts tending to cast doubt 
upon his witness’ testimony. 
Id. at 808–09; see also Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“[A prosecutor’s due process duty] requires a prosecutor to act when put on notice of 
the real possibility of false testimony.  This duty is not discharged by attempting to finesse 
the problem by pressing ahead without a diligent and a good faith attempt to resolve it.  A 
prosecutor cannot avoid this obligation by refusing to search for the truth and remaining 
willfully ignorant of the facts.”).  In Part IV, we propose a similar rule as an ethical standard 
for prosecutors. 
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II.  PRETRIAL DISCOVERY 
The general rubric of “discovery” is typically used to cover both 
inculpatory and exculpatory information.  It is helpful, though, to 
distinguish between inculpatory and exculpatory information for two 
reasons.  First, the rules regarding each rest on different legal foundations.  
The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to pretrial 
discovery of inculpatory information.91  Rather, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 (or a parallel state rule) is the primary source of the 
prosecutor’s obligation to provide the defendant with advance notice of 
inculpatory information.  When it comes to disclosure of exculpatory 
information, by contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a prosecutorial 
disclosure obligation grounded in due process.92  There also exists an 
explicit ethical rule requiring prosecutors to turn over exculpatory 
information to a defendant.93 
The second reason for distinguishing in our discussion between 
disclosure of inculpatory and exculpatory information is that the nature of 
the typical prosecutorial misconduct regarding each is different—late 
disclosure with inculpatory information versus nondisclosure with 
exculpatory information, although there is some overlap.94 
A.  Inculpatory Information 
The importance of comprehensive discovery in cases in which scientific 
proof is offered in evidence cannot be overstated.  As the Advisory 
Committee note to the federal discovery rule comments, “[I]t is difficult to 
test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.”95  
The American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Standards note that 
the “need for full and fair disclosure is especially apparent with respect to 
scientific proof and the testimony of experts.  This sort of evidence is 
practically impossible for the adversary to test or rebut at trial without an 
advance opportunity to examine it closely.”96  Moreover, the National 
Academy of Sciences has recommended extensive discovery in DNA cases:  
“All data and laboratory records generated by analysis of DNA samples 
should be made freely available to all parties.  Such access is essential for 
evaluating the analysis.”97  Indeed, the President’s DNA Initiative 
 
 91. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . . .”). 
 92. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37. 
 93. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2007). 
 94. There can also be late disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See infra text 
accompanying notes 138–42. 
 95. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note.  See generally Paul C. Giannelli, 
Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991). 
 96. Standards for Criminal Justice:  Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure 
Before Trial Standard 2.1, at 66 (Approved Draft 1970). 
 97. Nat’l Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 23 (1992); id. at 146 
(“The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to defense counsel and experts 
retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the evidence.”); 
GIANNELLI MCMUNIGAL AFTER BP 12/5/2007  3:36:19 PM 
1508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
emphasizes the value of pretrial discovery:  “Early disclosure can have the 
following benefits:  [1] Avoiding surprise and unnecessary delay.  [2] 
Identifying the need for defense expert services.  [3] Facilitating 
exoneration of the innocent and encouraging plea negotiations if DNA 
evidence confirms guilt.”98 
Several chronic problems relating to discovery abuses are addressed in 
this section. 
1.  Late Disclosure 
One way to undercut the defense’s ability to confront expert testimony is 
to delay disclosure.  This abuse is not uncommon. 
a.  Laboratory Reports 
Discovery provisions relating to experts typically require pretrial 
disclosure of laboratory reports.99  The widespread adoption of such 
provisions should make disclosure routine in all but the most exceptional 
cases.  Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find discovery violations due to 
tardy disclosure.  For example, in United States v. Wicker,100 the testimony 
of a prosecution expert was excluded as a discovery violation sanction 
because the laboratory report had not been disclosed in a timely manner.  
For the same reason, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the exclusion of the prosecution’s DNA evidence in United States v. 
Davis.101  The prosecution in Davis offered no reasons for the delay,102 and 
the court found prejudice. 
The government not only produced the DNA evidence a month late, but it 
did so almost literally on the eve of trial, making it virtually impossible, 
absent a continuance, for defendants to evaluate and confront the evidence 
 
see also id. at 105 (“Case records—such as notes, worksheets, autoradiographs, and 
population databanks—and other data or records that support examiners’ conclusions are 
prepared, retained by the laboratory, and made available for inspection on court order after 
review of the reasonableness of a request.”); Nat’l Research Council, The Evaluation of 
Forensic DNA Evidence 167–69 (1996) (“Certainly, there are no strictly scientific 
justifications for withholding information in the discovery process, and in Chapter 3 we 
discussed the importance of full, written documentation of all aspects of DNA laboratory 
operations.  Such documentation would facilitate technical review of laboratory work, both 
within the laboratory and by outside experts. . . .  Our recommendation that all aspects of 
DNA testing be fully documented is most valuable when this documentation is discoverable 
in advance of trial.”). 
 98. President’s DNA Initiative:  Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the Court 
(National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, CD-ROM, n.d.) (on file with 
author). 
 99. See Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 35, § 3.03 (discussing discovery 
provisions relating to scientific reports). 
 100. 848 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 101. 244 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 102. Id. at 671 (“Because the government has not given any explanation for the delay, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether the government had any justification for the 
delay.”). 
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against them.  DNA evidence is scientific and highly technical in nature; 
it would have required thorough investigation by defense counsel, 
including almost certainly retaining an expert witness or witnesses.103 
But exclusion of the prosecution expert’s testimony is not automatic.104  
Rather, it is the most drastic sanction and requires justification.105  The 
choice of sanction rests within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate 
courts will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.  In exercising its 
discretion, the trial court typically considers three factors:  (1) the reason for 
the violation, including whether the prosecution acted in bad faith; (2) “the 
extent of prejudice to the defendant”; and (3) “the feasibility of curing the 
prejudice with a continuance.”106  Courts frequently cite the failure of 
defense counsel to seek a continuance as evidence that the accused did not 
suffer prejudice.  This, of course, ignores the realities of trial practice—the 
difficulty encountered by defense attorneys in preparing for trial and 
rescheduling other cases.  In short, the accused is faced with what one court 
called a “Hobson’s choice”107—go to trial perhaps without adequate 
preparation or be forced to delay, which, in turn, provides the prosecution 
with a “tactical advantage” because “even with a continuance, the defense 
[is] forced to play catch-up.”108 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. E.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1999).  In this case, 
during direct examination of a prosecution witness, “the witness disclosed for the first time 
the existence of a laboratory test showing that the [ship’s] carpet tested negative for the 
presence of marijuana.” Id.  The court held that a mistrial was not required because defense 
counsel “effectively cross-examined the government witness who disclosed the report, and 
used the test results in its closing argument.” Id.; see also United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 
955, 958 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Because the government did not learn of this evidence [medical 
report and photographs] until a late date and acted expeditiously to deliver it to the defense, 
we conclude that the government did not act in bad faith in failing to disclose the evidence 
sooner.”); United States v. Edmonson, 962 F.2d 1535, 1545–46 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that a fingerprint report prepared a month after trial commenced but promptly provided to 
defense at that time demonstrated good faith); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 626 A.2d 
109, 112 (Pa. 1993) (finding that results of a semen test conducted on the first day of trial 
and promptly turned over to defense did not violate discovery rules unless the results were 
deliberately withheld). 
 105. See United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Our prior cases 
indicate that a district court must substantiate a defendant’s claim of prejudice before 
adopting the most severe discovery sanction available—wholesale exclusion of evidence.  
We therefore reverse the district court’s order.”); United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 
1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We note that the sanction requested by Defendant—exclusion of the 
witnesses’ expert testimony—is almost never imposed ‘in the absence of a constitutional 
violation or statutory authority for such exclusion.’” (citation omitted)). 
 106. Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061. 
 107. See Ayres v. State, 436 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1981) (“The State contends that its offer 
of a continuance to defendant (on the eve of trial and before receipt of the report) and 
defendant’s decline of the offer bars assertion of a suppression contention.  We consider that 
to have been a ‘Hobson’s choice’ in view of the prior continuance of four months that was 
granted the State for the express purpose of obtaining an analysis of the State’s physical 
evidence and presumably for arrangements to be made for an expert witness to testify as to 
the report’s findings.” (citation omitted)). 
 108. Davis, 244 F.3d at 673. 
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In some cases the abuses are recurrent and flagrant.  For example, Joyce 
Gilchrist frequently delayed the transfer of evidence for defense 
examination, a practice for which she was repeatedly chastised by the 
courts.109  Since a discovery request is directed to the prosecution, not the 
expert, it seems highly unlikely that this type of misconduct could have 
occurred so often without the prosecution’s awareness and acquiescence at 
the least, and collusion at the worst. 
b.  Summaries 
In 1994, Federal Rule 16 was amended to require a summary of expert 
testimony.110  This meant that federal prosecutors could no longer surprise 
defendants by calling experts who had not written reports.  Further, the 
basis of the expert’s opinion would now have to be disclosed.  The 
Advisory Committee notes commented, 
The amendment is intended to minimize surprise that often results from 
unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to 
provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the 
expert’s testimony through focused cross-examination. . . . Although no 
specific timing requirements are included [in the amendment], it is 
expected that the parties will make their requests and disclosures in a 
timely fashion.111 
Nevertheless, one of the first cases examining the amendment involved 
delayed disclosure.112  In United States v. Richmond,113 the district court 
 
 109. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1319–20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (“[I]t was 
approximately two weeks after the deadline ordered by Judge Owens that Ms. Gilchrist 
mailed the hair evidence to the appellant’s expert.  Thus, appellant’s expert received the 
evidence six and one-half days before trial began.”); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (“Instead of following either the letter of the Order or taking steps 
to have the Order changed or clarified by the court, she took it upon herself to determine the 
portions of the Order with which she wished to comply.  This was not her decision to 
make.”); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (“Ms. Gilchrist’s 
delay and neglect in not completing her forensic examination and report . . . was 
inexcusable, since she began her forensic examination in December of 1982.”). 
 110. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).  The Rule states, 
At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written 
summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.  If the 
government requests discovery under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant 
complies, the government must, at the defendant’s request, give to the defendant a 
written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial on the issue of the 
defendant’s mental condition. The summary provided under this subparagraph 
must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and 
the witness’s qualifications. 
Id. 
 111. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note. 
 112. Controversies concerning the amount of disclosure also soon developed. See United 
States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecution “barely” 
met the minimum requirements and cautioning, “[W]e strongly encourage the government to 
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wrote, “The government’s response is totally unrealistic given the purposes 
which prompted enactment of the Rule. . . . [D]isclosure three days before 
trial is absurd.”114 
c.  Continuing Duty to Disclose 
A closely related issue is the prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose 
newly developed information after a discovery request has been made.  
Federal Rule 16(c) recognizes a “continuing duty to disclose” scientific 
reports if, prior to or during trial, new reports are prepared.  The rationale 
for such a provision is self-evident.  The prosecutor should not be permitted 
to avoid discovery obligations simply because a scientific report is 
submitted after the prosecutor has complied with an initial discovery 
request.  In United States v. Kelly,115 neutron activation tests were 
conducted after the trial court ordered discovery of scientific reports.  The 
defense, however, was not informed of the tests until trial.  After 
recognizing the prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose the results of 
scientific tests, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote, 
“The course of the government smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in 
violation of the spirit of the rules.  A new trial is required, with a fair 
opportunity for the defense to run its own neutron activation tests of the 
material . . . .”116 
2.  Omitting Information from Lab Reports 
Leaving important information out of a laboratory report is another 
practice that undermines a defendant’s ability to confront expert testimony.  
In the Duke lacrosse case, the North Carolina Bar Association found that 
the prosecutor, Michael B. Nifong, violated numerous ethical rules in his 
 
offer more specific descriptions of the opinions of the witnesses, foundations for their 
testimony, and their qualifications.”). 
 113. 153 F.R.D. 7 (D. Mass. 1994). 
 114. Id. at 8.   
First, it is hard to imagine a situation in which the government would not learn of 
the need for expert testimony until the trial is underway except as rebuttal 
testimony.  The Rule, by its explicit terms, does not require disclosure of any 
experts to be called in rebuttal.  Rather, disclosure is limited to experts to be called 
by the government during its case in chief.  
Id. 
 115. 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 116. Id. at 29; see also United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Boney, 572 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1978) (involving a drug report); United 
States v. Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving a polarimeter test); 
Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 2006) (holding that when a medical examiner 
investigator realized that he had been mistaken in his deposition testimony, but this 
information was not given to defense prior to the trial, “the State also had an obligation to 
disclose any material change in that statement”); State v. Wilson, 507 N.E.2d 1109, 1110–12 
(Ohio 1987) (holding that the failure to update a neutron activation analysis report resulted in 
“trial by ambush”); Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1985) (finding that the 
state violated its continuing duty to disclose regarding a gunshot residue test). 
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handling of DNA evidence.117  DNA analysis of a rape kit revealed the 
profiles of multiple unidentified males.  Nifong, however, instructed the 
examiner (Dr. Brian Meehan) to write a report mentioning only positive 
matches, conduct that violated, inter alia, a discovery rule.118  In an 
Oklahoma case, the appellate court wrote that an expert’s report “was at 
best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and misleading” and the expert 
conceded at trial that “she failed to include her conclusion” in the report.119  
According to the court, “This significant omission, whether intentional or 
inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .”120 
This problem arises because, although lab reports are discoverable, 
discovery provisions do not specify the content of the report.121  For 
example, in Harrison v. State,122 the prosecution turned over an autopsy 
report in discovery.123  At trial the pathologist testified about a number of 
factors not disclosed to the defense, including the critical fact that the 
murder victim had been raped, the qualifying circumstance for imposing the 
 
 117. See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 20–
24, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. 
State Bar Jul. 31, 2007).  He was subsequently found in contempt by the trial judge in the 
case. See Day in Jail for Ex-Duke Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2007, at A9.  For an in-
depth discussion and analysis of the Duke lacrosse case, see Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke 
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications:  A Fundamental Failure to “Do 
Justice,” 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1337 (2007). 
 118. Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State Bar R. 3.4(c) (1997).  He also 
violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting false statements of material fact or law to a tribunal) and 
compounded this error by falsely representing to the court and opposing counsel that he had 
provided all discoverable information. Rule 4.1 (prohibiting false statements of material fact 
to a third person in course of representing a client); Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentations).  An additional violation of Rules 
3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) occurred at a December 15, 2006, hearing.  He also lied to the Grievance 
Committee investigating his conduct. See Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State 
Bar R. (1997). 
 119. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. (citations omitted); see also Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1991) (“What is even more disturbing . . . is the fact that Ms. Gilchrist’s pretrial 
forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a ‘unique characteristic’ 
concerning appellant’s pubic hairs.  However, in his opening argument, the prosecutor 
alerted the jury to the State’s expert’s finding of the ‘unique characteristic.’  Clearly, this 
significant omission in Ms. Gilchrist’s report, whether intentional or inadvertent, coupled 
with the State’s extreme tardiness in complying with the discovery order, resulted in trial by 
ambush on a very critical piece of evidence.”). 
 121. Sometimes the crucial information is omitted from the laboratory report, and the 
prosecutor is left in the dark along with the defense counsel.  For example, in Jones v. City of 
Chicago, a Chicago crime lab technician, after talking to detectives, intentionally deleted an 
exculpatory conclusion from her report in a murder case. 856 F.2d 985, 988–93 (7th Cir. 
1988); id. at 988 (calling the deletion “a frightening abuse of power by members of the 
Chicago police force”).  The court also noted, “[P]olice laboratory technician Mary 
Furlong . . . discovered that [defendant] George Jones had different semen and blood types 
from the types found in [the victim’s] vagina.  Furlong failed to include this information in 
the lab report . . . .” Id. at 991.  Sometimes the information is favorable, which raises Brady 
issues as discussed below. See infra notes 133–37. 
 122. 635 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 1994) (en banc). 
 123. See id. at 898. 
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death penalty.  The Mississippi Supreme Court held that it could not 
“countenance or condone the willful withholding of crucial evidence during 
discovery.”124  In State v. Wilson,125 a laboratory report indicated that a 
gunshot residue test was inconclusive.  However, at trial the expert testified 
that evidence of barium (a primer residue) alone was consistent with the 
firing of a gun.  The defense was never informed of this opinion and thus 
was misled by the report.  The Supreme Court of Ohio criticized the 
prosecutor’s conduct as “trial by ambush.”126 
Often, such tactics are intentional.  In a symposium on the ethical 
responsibilities of forensic scientists, one article discussed laboratory 
reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing 
minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for 
cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an interpretation on 
the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be provided from 
the witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to 
trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”127 
3.  Failing to Prepare a Lab Report 
Another recurring problem is an expert failing entirely to prepare a 
report.  Roy Brown spent fifteen years in prison for murder before he was 
exonerated by DNA evidence.128  The case rested largely on bite marks on 
the victim’s body that a local dentist testified matched Brown’s teeth.129  
Unbeknownst to the defense, a leading forensic odontologist, Lowell 
Levine, had analyzed the bite marks on the victim and concluded that the 
one mark he could interpret excluded Brown as the source of the mark.  The 
prosecutor, however, “never asked Dr. Levine to file an official report . . . .  
Instead, the prosecutors relied on another expert, a local dentist, whose 
testimony helped convict Mr. Brown.”130 
 
 124. Id. at 900.  “The evidence withheld from the defense was in the form of expert 
opinion testimony, and was the only proof offered on the issue of rape, a necessary element 
of the offense charged in the indictment.” Id. at 896. 
 125. 507 N.E.2d 1109 (Ohio 1987). 
 126. Id. at 1112. 
 127. Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist:  Exploring 
the Limits, 34 J. Forensic Sci. 719, 724 (1989). 
 128. See People v. Brown, 600 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1993) (upholding 
conviction).  Rejecting a postconviction discovery request, another court later wrote, “In the 
instant case DNA testing was available at the time of investigation and trial but the 
defendant failed to avail himself of such procedures.” People v. Brown, 618 N.Y.S.2d 188, 
190 (Cayuga County Ct. 1994).  Dr. Levine’s opinion could also be characterized as Brady 
material. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37. 
 129. Fernanda Santos, Evidence from Bite Marks, It Turns Out, Is Not So Elementary, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2007, at WK4 (“At the time of his conviction, Mr. Brown, 46, was 
missing two front teeth.  The bite marks, meanwhile, had six tooth imprints.”). 
 130. Fernanda Santos, With DNA from Exhumed Body, Man Finally Wins Freedom, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 24, 2007, at B5. 
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B.  Exculpatory Information 
The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is grounded in constitutional 
due process, ethical precepts, and pretrial discovery rules.131  Although 
there is an obvious overlap among these sources of the duty to disclose, 
there are also important differences.132 
1.  Due Process 
Due process, according to Brady v. Maryland,133 includes the right to the 
disclosure of exculpatory material evidence in the possession of the 
prosecution.  Numerous scientific evidence cases have involved Brady 
issues.134  For example, in Hilliard v. Williams,135 a Tennessee prosecutor 
deliberately suppressed an exculpatory Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) forensic report, which determined that the devastating blood stains in 
a murder case were not blood stains.  In Gordon v. Thornberg,136 the 
accused’s shoes were sent to the FBI laboratory, which determined that 
there were no flammable substances on the shoes.  “Subsequently, the shoes 
were sent to the University of Rhode Island’s crime laboratory.  The URI 
 
 131. Some jurisdictions have discovery provisions that cover this subject. See, e.g., Ohio 
R. Crim. P. 16(B)(1)(f). 
 132. As discussed below, the constitutional duty to disclose is a trial, not pretrial, right.  
Moreover, in contrast to the constitutional duty, the ethical rule and discovery provisions do 
not contain a “materiality” requirement. 
 133. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”). 
 134. In United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), the prosecution charged 
Orville Stifel with murdering his former girlfriend’s fiancé by sending a bomb through the 
mail.  Crucial prosecution evidence involved neutron activation analysis performed on bomb 
debris (vinyl tape, metal cap, cardboard mailing tube, and paper gummed label) and similar 
items obtained from Stifel’s place of employment.  The prosecution expert testified that the 
label and cardboard tube were “of the same type and same manufacture.” Id. at 436 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The metal cap and tape were “of the same manufacture” and from 
the “same batch”—one day’s manufacturing production. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  After his conviction, Stifel filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act. 
See United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1528 (N.D. Ohio 1984).  The Freedom of 
Information Act material revealed the existence of another suspect in the bombing and 
discrepancies about the background tests on the tape. Id.  As a result, Stifel filed a 
postconviction petition, alleging a Brady violation.  He argued that the expert, when cross-
examined, had failed to disclose that additional tests had been performed on the tape.  The 
court disagreed that the expert had misrepresented the facts on this issue, but noted the 
misleading character of this information in granting relief:  “[H]ad the defense known of the 
November 1968 tests performed by [the expert] on tape obtained from Plymouth Rubber 
Company, it could have used this evidence to further impeach the credibility of [the expert’s] 
scientific methods.” Id. at 1543; see also Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 35, § 3.12, at 
184 (listing cases). 
 135. 516 F.2d 1344, 1346 (6th Cir. 1975).  In an unreported opinion overturning Lilly 
Hilliard’s first conviction, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the blood on 
Hilliard’s jacket was “‘[o]f quite devastating impact.’” Id. at 1351.  After spending a year in 
prison, Hilliard was acquitted in a retrial in which the FBI report was admitted into evidence. 
 136. 790 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1992). 
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crime lab found gasoline on the shoes.  When the existence of the negative 
FBI lab report became known, the state court granted Mr. Gordon’s motion 
for a mistrial.”137 
The Brady rule raises a number of issues:  (1) the timing of disclosure, 
(2) the “exculpatory” requirement, (3) the “materiality” requirement, (4) 
appropriate sanctions, and (5) Brady’s applicability to crime laboratories. 
a.  Timing of Disclosure 
Brady is a trial right, not a pretrial disclosure rule.  Nevertheless, 
exculpatory evidence must be disclosed in time for defense counsel to make 
use of it.138  Here, as with the discovery rules discussed above, delayed 
disclosure may place a defendant in an untenable position.  In Ex parte 
Mowbray,139 a murder case, the prosecutor used a blood spatter expert to 
refute the defense suicide theory.  According to the prosecutor, his case 
“depended upon” this evidence.  Prior to trial, the prosecution retained 
another expert, Herbert MacDonell, considered the premier expert in the 
field.  After reviewing the crime scene, the physical evidence and the 
photographs, MacDonell concluded months before trial that “it was more 
probable than not that the deceased died from a suicide rather than a 
homicide.”140  Yet the defense did not receive his written report until ten 
days before trial and then only after the trial judge threatened sanctions.  
MacDonell never testified.141  The court wrote, 
 . . . State’s counsel early on recognized the potential lethal effect of 
MacDonell’s testimony on their theory of the case, and beginning in 
November and continuing until May they engaged in a deliberate course 
of conduct to keep MacDonell’s findings and opinions from Applicant’s 
counsel until the last days before trial.  Even then they caused Applicant’s 
counsel to believe MacDonell would be a witness and available for cross-
examination.142 
 
 137. Id. at 375 n.1. The vice in this case was not the request for a second opinion but 
rather the failure to disclose the opinion contained in the FBI report. 
 138. 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b), at 487 (2d ed. 1999). 
 139. 943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).  “The State had an obligation to 
be forthcoming when the Brady motion was heard and granted in March.  Instead, it chose to 
suppress MacDonell’s exculpatory evidence until its hand was forced by the trial judge only 
days before trial, and, in so doing, the State denied Applicant due process.” Id. at 465 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Fredda “Susan” Mowbray was acquitted on a retrial. See 
Mowbray v. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that no case 
has extended Brady liability to laboratory technicians). 
 140. Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d at 463 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Id. at 464. 
 142. Id. at 465 (quoting habeas judge); see also United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 
1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The late disclosure of this exculpatory information [negative 
fingerprint report] is troubling, and it highlights the need for vigilance by prosecutors in 
ensuring that government agents are informed of and respect Brady requirements.”); Ayres 
v. State, 436 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1981) (finding a Brady violation in a rape case).  In Ayres, 
the court held, “We also conclude that the State’s delay in submitting the entire package of 
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b.  “Exculpatory” Requirement 
Brady does not apply unless the evidence is exculpatory.  Consequently, 
labeling a laboratory report as inconclusive may relieve the prosecution of 
the disclosure requirement.  For example, in one case an inconclusive 
handwriting report “was not exculpatory, but merely not inculpatory.”143  
Similarly, a report showing that hair from a rape defendant was not found at 
the scene of the crime was deemed a “neutral” report.144  However, as one 
court correctly understood, 
[S]uch a characterization [as neutral] often has little meaning; evidence 
such as this may, because of its neutrality, tend to be favorable to the 
accused.  While it does not by any means establish his absence from the 
scene of the crime, it does demonstrate that a number of factors which 
could link the defendant to the crime do not.145 
Similarly, in Bell v. Coughlin,146 the prosecution failed to turn over FBI 
ballistics test results to the defense. 
The lab positively matched a cartridge shell (B3) to the .45 caliber pistol 
but reported that no conclusion could be reached with respect to the two 
bullets (J/R2 and J/R4) in its possession.  Thus, although the results of the 
FBI tests may be characterized as mixed, they clearly contained 
exculpatory material.147 
c.  Materiality Requirement 
In the Brady context, materiality means outcome determinative.  The 
suppressed evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”148  This is an unnecessarily 
stringent standard.149  In scientific evidence cases, problems have arisen 
with determining what is “material” evidence.150  In Nelson v. Zant,151 the 
 
physical evidence to the FBI was the probable cause of the late delivery of the report and the 
unavailability of an FBI witness to testify as to its findings.” Id. 
 143. United States v. Hauff, 473 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 144. Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241, 1243–44 (4th Cir. 1976).  In Sadler v. State, the 
prosecution’s failure to turn over an “inconclusive” DNA report did not violate Brady. 846 
P.2d 377, 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). 
 145. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 479 (4th Cir. 1974) (involving an FBI lab report on 
shoeprint, soil sample, hair sample, murder weapon, and clothing). 
 146. 820 F. Supp. 780, 786–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 17 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 147. Id. at 786–87 (citation omitted). 
 148. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
 149. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 
689–90 (2006) (“The most pernicious consequence of the judiciary’s radical reconstruction 
of the concept of materiality has been to afford prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to 
conceal favorable evidence from the defense in the completely rational expectation that the 
suppression either will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be found by a reviewing 
court to not be material.”). 
 150. E.g., Bonnell v. Mitchell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 698, 726–27 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 
(“Regarding the negative test result of the gun nitrates on the defendant’s jacket, there is no 
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critical evidence in the case was a hair found on the victim’s body.  The 
state’s expert testified that the hair not only could have come from the 
defendant but that it could only have come from about 120 people in the 
entire Savannah area.  The prosecution failed to disclose that the FBI had 
also examined the hair and had concluded that the hair was not suitable for 
comparison purposes.  On review, the prosecution argued that this 
information was not “material” within the meaning of Brady.  The Supreme 
Court of Georgia reversed.152 
d.  Application to Crime Laboratories  
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended Brady to cover exculpatory 
information in the control of the police.153  Some courts have explicitly 
included crime labs within the reach of Brady.  In one case, the Supreme 
Court of California noted that a laboratory examiner “worked closely” with 
prosecutors and was part of the investigative team.154  The court concluded 
that the “prosecutor thus had the obligation to determine if the lab’s files 
contained any exculpatory evidence, such as the worksheet, and disclose it 
to petitioner.”155 
In another case, a court wrote that an experienced crime lab technician 
“must have known of his legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence 
to the prosecutors, their obligation to pass it along to the defense, and his 
 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this test 
result been admitted.  As the forensic scientist in this case testified regarding another matter, 
a negative test result does not make a positive finding.”).  But see People v. Salazar, 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 262, 279 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]hile there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
affirm the conviction, we cannot be confident in the jury’s verdict because of the Brady 
violation.  Had the jury been aware of Dr. Ribe’s credibility problems, which would have 
cast doubt on the prosecution’s investigation, the case would have been cast in a different 
light with a reasonable probability of a different result.”). 
 151. 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991). 
 152. Id. at 252.  Scheck and his colleagues provide this vignette: 
Analyst Maria Pulling reported that Reynolds matched none of the trace evidence.  
She signed the report and forwarded it to the front desk of the lab for delivery to 
the prosecutor and the defense.  But the exculpatory report was never delivered to 
the defense.  Ten years later, the volunteer counsel . . . obtained DNA exonerations 
of both men . . . .  That was when Pulling first learned the case had gone to trial.  
When she found out that her report had been concealed, she was astonished. 
Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 174 (discussing Donald Reynolds’s case). 
 153. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (“[I]t may be said that no one doubts 
that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know.  But neither 
is there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the 
prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to 
every lawyer who deals with it.’  Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the 
government’s Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from 
disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the 
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the 
government’s obligation to ensure fair trials.”). 
 154. In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719 (Cal. 1998). 
 155. Id. 
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obligation not to cover up a Brady violation by perjuring himself.”156  
While the expert should have been on notice about perjury, it is less clear 
that the Brady obligation would be known to lab personnel—without the 
prosecutor tutoring the lab.  How often do prosecutors discharge this duty?  
Many lab examiners have never heard of Brady. 
2.  Ethical Rule 
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to 
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.”157  The 
Model Rule is broader than the Brady rule.  It has no materiality limitation 
and it includes information as well as evidence.  The ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards also provide that a prosecutor should disclose “[a]ny material or 
information within the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends to 
negate the guilt of the defendant.”158  In the Duke lacrosse case, the 
prosecutor violated North Carolina’s version of Model Rule 3.8(d) by 
instructing the DNA analyst to write a report mentioning only positive 
matches.159 
As many commentators have recognized, disciplinary sanctions for 
Brady violations appear to be illusory.160  As one scholar who researched 
disciplinary actions against prosecutors noted, “When it comes to 
disciplining a prosecutor who commits Brady-type misconduct . . . 
punishment is virtually nonexistent.”161  Given this pattern of 
 
 156. Charles v. City of Boston, 365 F. Supp. 2d 82, 89 (D. Mass. 2005).  But see 
Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that extending Brady to lab 
personnel is “unsound”); Mowbray v. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 
2001) (noting that no case has extended Brady liability to laboratory technicians). 
 157. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2007) (special responsibilities of a 
prosecutor).  One would think “timely” would mean at least in time to make use of it at trial.  
But what about in time for use in considering a guilty plea?  Or making a motion to dismiss?  
Or conducting an investigation? 
 158. Standards for Criminal Justice:  Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii) 
(3d ed. 1996). 
 159. See Revised N.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (1997); supra notes 118–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 160. See Gershman, supra note 149, at 687 (“Brady is insufficiently enforced when 
violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden.”); Joseph 
R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy:  The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of 
Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 833, 934 (1997) 
(“We should not continue to permit the almost total lack of meaningful sanctions to enforce 
the command of Brady to constitute our own sanction for the misconduct of our 
prosecutors.”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:  It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 275, 281–82 (2004). 
 161. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:  
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 742 (1987).  Furthermore, whether Brady applies to 
posttrial exculpatory information is not clear. See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Fingers 
Pointed at HPD Crime Lab in Death Row Case, Houston Chron., Apr. 24, 2003, at 1A 
(“[T]he attorneys handling his appeal discovered that before Rousseau’s trial, HPD’s 
ballistics lab had matched the bullet that killed [the victim] to bullets from another killing . . . 
[and] about one month after Rousseau was sentenced the police crime lab matched bullets 
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nonenforcement of Model Rule 3.8(d), the disciplinary action in the Duke 
lacrosse case is striking. 
C.  Recommendations 
There are several ways these problems can be addressed.  First, there is 
little question that the common discovery provisions are flawed because 
they fail to specify the contents of scientific reports.  The primary objective 
of discovery is to enable a defendant to address and challenge the accuracy 
of the evidence presented against him.  Lack of detail in an expert’s report 
seriously compromises the defense’s ability to do this.  Permitting forensic 
experts to testify without first preparing a report is even worse. 
Discovery provisions should be amended in accordance with the 2006 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards on DNA Evidence.162  Part III of the 
Standards includes provisions on DNA laboratories and the testing of 
evidence.163  The Standards recommend that most laboratory protocols and 
procedures be publicly available and that each step in the testing of DNA 
evidence and in the interpretation of the test results be recorded 
contemporaneously in case notes.164  Comprehensive laboratory reports are 
recommended.165  Moreover, all case notes, raw electronic data, and lab 
reports are discoverable.166  Under this approach, all tests are disclosed, 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory.  There is no materiality requirement 
and pretrial disclosure is mandated.  This information should be available 
before plea negotiations commence.167 
Second, ethical and discovery rules should explicitly require the 
prosecutor to instruct crime laboratories and other experts of their Brady 
obligations.  The Supreme Court has imposed such a requirement with 
Brady material concerning deals with witnesses, remarking that “procedures 
and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to 
 
from both shootings to a gun found on Juan Guerrero, who was convicted of the other 
murder.  Prosecutors never turned over the crucial findings that would have supported 
Rousseau’s innocence as required, his attorneys said.”). 
 162. The Standards cover a wide range of topics, including provisions on (1) the 
collection, preservation, and retention of DNA evidence; (2) pretrial disclosure; (3) defense 
testing and retesting; (4) the admissibility of DNA evidence; (5) postconviction testing; (6) 
charging persons by DNA profile; and (7) DNA databases. See generally Standards for 
Criminal Justice:  Standards on DNA Evidence (2006). 
 163. The Standards mandate (1) laboratory accreditation every two years; (2) written 
policies, including protocols for testing and interpreting test results; (3) quality assurance 
procedures, including audits, proficiency testing, and corrective action protocols; (4) 
procedures designed to minimize cognitive bias when interpreting test results; and (5) timely 
reports of credible evidence of lab misconduct or serious negligence. Id. 
 164. See id. Standard 3.1 (testing laboratories), Standard 3.2 (testing and interpretation of 
DNA evidence). 
 165. See id. Standard 3.3 (laboratory reports). 
 166. See id. Standard 4.1 (disclosure in pretrial proceedings). 
 167. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 
Hastings L.J. 957 (1989) (discussing the importance of Brady disclosure during plea 
negotiations).  But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (rejecting this view). 
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insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every 
lawyer who deals with it.”168  The ABA recently recommended that 
prosecutors should “[e]nsure that law enforcement agencies, laboratories 
and other experts understand their obligations to inform prosecutors about 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence.”169 
Finally, the rules should be enforced.  Discovery sanctions should be 
imposed for late disclosure and other violations. 
III.  PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 
Presentation of misleading expert testimony can range from outright 
fraud to more subtle tactics.  The Model Rules prohibit knowingly using 
false testimony170 and preclude an attorney from “knowingly . . . mak[ing] 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”171  They also forbid an 
attorney from engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”172  The ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that it is 
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to “intentionally misstate the 
evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”173  There are 
also due process prohibitions against, as well as criminal statutes 
prohibiting, knowingly using false testimony.174 
A.  Perjured Testimony 
Miller v. Pate175 is perhaps the most cited case of flagrant misconduct 
involving scientific evidence.  Prior to trial, a defense request for the 
inspection of physical evidence that the prosecution intended to introduce at 
trial was denied.176  At trial, a prosecution expert testified that stains on 
underwear shorts were type A blood, which matched the defendant’s blood 
 
 168. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (finding a Brady violation even 
though the prosecutor who tried the case was unaware of the deal made by another 
prosecutor).  See generally Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the failure of a district attorney to promulgate policies regarding the sharing of 
information about informants and the failure to adequately train and supervise deputy district 
attorneys on this subject was not protected by absolute immunity in a civil rights action). 
 169. ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Ad Hoc Innocence Comm. to Ensure the Integrity 
of the Criminal Process, Achieving Justice:  Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty 99 
(Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter Achieving Justice]. 
 170. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits an attorney from “offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007).  The ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice also state that it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to 
“knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony 
of witnesses.” Standards for Criminal Justice:  Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 
3-5.6(a) (3d ed. 1993). 
 171. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward the tribunal). 
 172. Id. R. 8.4(c) (misconduct). 
 173. Standards for Criminal Justice:  Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 3-
5.8(a). 
 174. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); 
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
 175. 386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 176. Id. at 2. 
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type.177  The prosecution repeatedly referred to this “crucial testimony” in 
closing argument, waving the “bloody” shorts in front of the jury.178  At a 
subsequent federal habeas corpus hearing, the defense had the opportunity 
to examine the shorts and discovered that the stains were paint, not blood.  
In addition, these proceedings indicated that the prosecutor was aware of 
this fact at the time of trial.179  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment [Due Process Clause] cannot tolerate a state 
criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.”180 
Outright mendacity is probably rare.  Yet, as discussed below, other more 
common practices probe and press ethical boundaries. 
B.  Witness Preparation 
In some countries, it is viewed as unethical for a lawyer to meet with a 
witness to prepare testimony.  But in our adversary system, a lawyer is 
viewed as acting incompetently if she fails to meet with and prepare a 
witness.  The adversary process requires attorneys to put forth their 
strongest case, a requirement that incentivizes lawyers to pressure their 
witnesses to testify in a way most favorable to the lawyers’ clients’ 
positions.181  Sometimes the pressure is overt.182  At other times it is subtle 
but nevertheless unmistakable.183  The issue has been raised so often that 
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards include this provision:  “A prosecutor 
who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the independence of 
 
 177. Id. at 3–4. 
 178. Id. at 5–6.  A later investigation established that the stains were both blood and paint. 
See The Vindication of a Prosecutor, 59 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 335, 335 
(1968). 
 179. Miller, 386 U.S. at 6. 
 180. Id. at 7. 
 181. See Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy:  Expert Testimony Before the Bench, 
Tech. Rev., Aug.–Sept. 1987, at 43, 44–45 (“[E]xperts [are] vulnerable to the possibly 
distorting influence of lawyers.  Long before the expert and lawyers arrive in court, a bond 
has formed between them.  The influence of the lawyer is considerable.”); John I. Thornton, 
Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1983, at 288, 292 (“The evidence will 
be selected or rejected with only those items that conform to the arguments of one side 
actually being submitted for examination.  A distinct possibility exists that the results of the 
examination by the forensic scientist will be skewed. . . . These situations represent potential 
sources of mischief. . . . The danger is that conflicts easily arise between scientist and 
lawyer—the former attempts to describe the evidence as it actually is, while the latter 
attempts to describe it in the most favorable light.”). 
 182. See Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 258 (1988) (stating that “[t]he 
District Court further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an 
expert witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave testimony adverse to 
the Government”); Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science:  
Testimony on Bite Marks Prone to Error, Chi. Trib., Oct. 19, 2004, §1, at 21 (“‘You get 
pushed a little bit by prosecutors, and sometimes you say OK to get them to shut up. . . .  I 
allowed myself to be pushed.’” (quoting a forensic dentist)). 
 183. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 31 (“Asked later if he was pressured to change his 
findings on Coakley, [Dr.] Shaler [the expert] said no.  ‘Most attorneys,’ Shaler would also 
say, ‘like to let you know what their opinions of the facts of the case are—irrespective of the 
scientific conclusions.’”). 
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the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the expert’s 
opinion on the subject.”184  The commentary to the Standard reads, 
“Statements made by physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts about their 
experiences as witnesses in criminal cases indicate the need for 
circumspection on the part of prosecutors who engage experts.”185 
An example of the problem is found in John Grisham’s first nonfiction 
book, The Innocent Man, which tells the story of Ron Williamson.186  Five 
days before Williamson’s scheduled execution for murder, a federal judge 
granted his petition for habeas relief.187  The police had focused on 
Williamson and an acquaintance, despite the discovery of an unidentified 
bloody palm print at the crime scene.  The print matched neither the 
suspects nor the victim, a fact that by itself might raise reasonable doubt.  
Then the fingerprint examiner inexplicably developed qualms about his 
earlier opinion.  Consequently, four and a half years after the crime, the 
prosecution exhumed the victim’s body, obtained new prints (from a now 
decomposing body), and the fingerprint expert changed his opinion, the 
“only time in his twenty-four-year career.”188  Now the bloody print 
matched the victim’s palm, and the prosecution could proceed against 
Williamson,189 who would later be exonerated by DNA.190 
Troedel v. Wainwright191 offers another illustration.  Defendants David 
W. Troedel and David Lee Hawkins were convicted of capital murder in 
separate trials.  An FBI report of a gunshot residue test using neutron 
activation analysis concluded that swabs “from the hands of Troedel and 
Hawkins contained antimony and barium [primer components] in amounts 
typically found on the hands of a person who has discharged a firearm or 
has had his hands in close proximity to a discharging firearm.”192  The 
expert, John Riley, testified in accordance with this report at Hawkins’s trial 
but enhanced his testimony at Troedel’s trial, where he testified that 
“Troedel had fired the murder weapon.”193  State courts upheld Troedel’s 
conviction.  During federal habeas proceedings, Riley’s deposition was 
 
 184. Standards for Criminal Justice:  Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 3-3.3(a) 
(3d ed. 1993). 
 185. Id. at cmt. 59.  The commentary further adds, “Nothing should be done by a 
prosecutor to cast suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the expert color an 
opinion to favor the interests of the prosecutor.” Id. 
 186. John Grisham, The Innocent Man:  Murder and Injustice in a Small Town (2006). 
 187. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d, 110 F.3d 
1508 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 188. Grisham, supra note 186, at 121. 
 189. The examination of the hair evidence was also suspect.  The first examiner found 
that the hair samples recovered at the scene were “consistent only with” the victim’s hair.  
The case was then transferred to another examiner, who, after twenty-seven months, found 
that the crime scene samples were consistent with the defendants’ hair. Id. at 179–80.  For a 
further discussion of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 210–13. 
 190. Glen Gore, who testified against Ron Williamson, was later proved to be the actual 
killer through DNA evidence. Grisham, supra note 186, at 311, 346. 
 191. 667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 192. Id. at 1458. 
 193. Id. at 1459. 
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taken, at which time he testified that “he could not, from the results of his 
tests, determine or say to a scientific certainty who had fired the murder 
weapon” and the “amount of barium and antimony on the hands of Troedel 
and Hawkins were basically insignificant.”194 
The district court found Riley’s trial testimony “at the very least” 
misleading.195  Riley claimed that the prosecutor had “pushed” him further 
in Troedel’s trial, a claim the prosecutor substantiated: 
. . . [O]ne of the prosecutors testified [at the habeas hearing] that, at 
Troedel’s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his opinion which was 
contained in his written report, the prosecutor pushed to “see if more 
could have been gotten out of this witness.”  When questioned why, in the 
Hawkins trial, he did not use Mr. Riley’s opinion that Troedel had fired 
the weapon, the prosecutor responded he did not know why.196 
In granting habeas relief, the court found, 
 In light of this admission, the above testimony received at the 
evidentiary hearing and the inconsistent positions taken by the 
prosecution at Hawkins’ and Troedel’s trials, respectively, the Court 
concludes that the opinion Troedel had fired the weapon was known by 
the prosecution not to be based on the results of the neutron activation 
analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or even probability.  Thus, the 
subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the State 
knowing it to be misleading.197 
C.  Withholding Information at Trial 
In Driscoll v. Delo,198 a capital murder case, the laboratory report 
indicated that blood traces on Robert Driscoll’s knife were type A, which 
matched the blood of a prison guard who had been injured by a stab wound 
but did not match the blood type of a murdered guard whose blood type was 
O.199  To explain the absence of type O blood, the prosecution offered 
several theories, one of which was that the presence of the type O blood 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1459–60.  The court also found David Troedel’s counsel ineffective.  Because 
defense counsel knew that the gunshot residue testimony was “critical,” his “failure either to 
depose the State’s expert witness or, more importantly, to consult with any other expert in 
the field, fell outside the scope of reasonably professional assistance.” Id. at 1461. 
 198. 71 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 199. Id. at 707.  The defense counsel was also ineffective: 
[Whether the alleged murder weapon] had blood matching the victim’s constituted 
an issue of the utmost importance.  Under these circumstances, a reasonable 
defense lawyer would take some measures to understand the laboratory tests 
performed and the inferences that one could logically draw from the results.  At 
the very least, any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would study the 
state’s laboratory report with sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a 
theory at trial that was at odds with the serology evidence, the defense would be in 
a position to expose it on cross-examination. 
Id. at 709. 
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was “masked” by the type A blood.200  The chief serologist of the state 
crime laboratory testified about this theory at trial.201  Only in a subsequent 
habeas proceeding was it revealed that the serologist had performed another 
procedure (a lattes test) which had eliminated the “masking” problem, 
revealing the lack of type O blood.202  “The jury was never informed that 
the lattes test was performed or that no type O blood was on the knife. . . .  
In its closing argument, the state made much of the masking theory, turning 
unfavorable serology evidence into neutral evidence at worst.”203 
In the infamous Cruz and Hernandez prosecution, the misuse of scientific 
evidence as well as other evidence led a police officer and an assistant 
attorney general to resign in protest during the initial proceedings and led to 
trials of the original prosecutors and police officers.204  Professor Barry 
Scheck and his colleagues explain one instance of misconduct: 
 When a crime technician arrived at the courthouse to testify for the 
state, he pulled aside one of the prosecutors and relayed some news:  
representatives from the Nike shoe company said that the prints at the 
back window had been made by a woman’s shoe, perhaps size six or five 
and a half.  Either size was too small for Cruz or Hernandez.  The 
prosecutor put the technician on the witness stand and carefully avoided 
any mention of shoe size or likely gender.  In fact, the defense was not 
told about the Nike analysis.205 
D.  Failure to Correct Overstatements 
Expert testimony that goes beyond the limitations of a scientific 
technique is not unusual.206  It is often difficult to discern, however, 
whether the prosecutor is a knowing participant in this context.  
Nevertheless, because “competence” is the first ethical obligation of an 
attorney and no criminal practitioner should go into court today without 
understanding scientific evidence, a claim of ignorance merely shifts the 
ethical lapse from one rule to another. 
 
 200. Id. at 707. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 708. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 44–46.  The case is also discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 10–20.  Stephen Buckley was the third defendant. 
 205. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 178. 
 206. See State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 1974) (“We are concerned . . . 
about the sweeping and unqualified manner in which [the expert’s] testimony was 
offered . . . .  An expert witness could be permitted to testify that in his opinion the 
chemicals present on defendant’s hand may have resulted from the firing of a gun.  He 
should not have been permitted to state, as he did, that this defendant had definitely fired a 
gun.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 
59 Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1024 (1971) (“[F]ew experts have used appropriate care in limiting their 
testimony . . . .”). 
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Hair evidence is illustrative.207  In one case, the expert testified that the 
crime scene hair sample “was unlikely to match anyone” other than the 
defendant, Edward Honaker.208  This testimony was a gross overstatement.  
At best, the expert could have testified that the hairs were consistent, which 
means that they could have come from Honaker or thousands of other 
people.  A competent prosecutor should have known this.  Indeed, another 
prosecutor would later acknowledge that “[t]here was no question that the 
state hair expert [at Honaker’s trial] had overstated the distinctiveness of the 
hair recovered from the victim’s shorts in his trial testimony.”209 
Similarly, in Williamson v. Reynolds,210 the expert testified at trial that 
hair samples were “consistent microscopically”211 and then went on to 
explain what this meant:  “In other words, hairs are not an absolute 
identification, but they either came from this individual or there is—could 
be another individual somewhere in the world that would have the same 
characteristics to their hair.”212  As John Grisham notes, “There is an 
excellent chance that [the hairs] could not have come from the same source, 
but such testimony was rarely volunteered, at least on direct 
examination.”213  Both Honaker and Williamson were later exonerated by 
DNA testing. 
In Mitchell v. State,214 Joyce Gilchrist’s testimony implicated the accused 
in a sexual assault.  She knew, however, that her testimony had been 
completely undercut by an exculpatory DNA report, which had been 
withheld from the defense.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
observed that this improper conduct was compounded by “the prosecutor, 
whom the district court found had ‘labored extensively at trial to obscure 
 
 207. See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Forensic Science:  Hair 
Comparison Evidence, 37 Crim. L. Bull. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases 
in which hair evidence was used to convict the innocent); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick 
D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:  Nineteenth Century Science or 
Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the 
purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they 
have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from 
criminal trials.”). 
 208. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 58. 
 209. Harland Levy, And the Blood Cried Out:  A Prosecutor’s Spellbinding Account of 
the Power of DNA 153 (1996). 
 210. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d sub nom., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 
1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 186–90 (discussing 
other aspects of the Williamson case). 
 211. Id. at 1554. 
 212. Id. (emphasis added).  The defendant was later exonerated by exculpatory DNA 
evidence, and, as Scheck and his colleagues point out, “The hair evidence was patently 
unreliable.” Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 146; see also id. at 134 (“Not until December 
1985, three years after the murder, did the state finish its first report on the hair examination.  
A trained hair man named Melvin Hett concluded that thirteen hairs found around the 
victim’s body appeared to have come from the head and pubis of Dennis Fritz [an alleged 
accomplice].  Another four hairs from the murder scene were linked to Ron Williamson.  By 
itself, though, the hair report was not strong enough to prove capital murder.”). 
 213. Grisham, supra note 186, at 179. 
 214. 884 P.2d 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
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the true DNA test results and to highlight [the expert’s] test results,’ and 
whose characterization of the FBI report in his closing argument was 
‘entirely unsupported by evidence and . . . misleading.’”215 
E.  Technically Accurate but Misleading Opinions 
A more difficult issue arises when the testimony is accurate in a technical 
sense and yet misleading.  The controversial Sacco and Vanzetti case, in 
which the defendants were charged with murder during a payroll robbery in 
1921, is illustrative.  Many believe their execution resulted more from their 
foreign status and “radical” beliefs than from the cogency of the evidence 
presented against them.  Firearms identification evidence played a critical 
role in this prosecution.  The firearms identification testimony was 
“carelessly assembled, incompletely and confusedly presented,” and was, in 
the view of some commentators, “beyond the comprehension” of the 
jury.216  After reviewing the case, Professors Edmund M. Morgan and G. 
Louis Joughin noted, 
On October 23 Captain Proctor made [a posttrial] affidavit indicating that 
he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor] that he would have to answer in 
the negative if he were asked whether he had found positive evidence that 
the fatal bullet had been fired from Sacco’s pistol.  The statement which 
Proctor made on the witness stand was:  “My opinion is that it is 
consistent with being fired by that pistol.”217 
Although the “consistent with” language is technically correct, it involves a 
distinction too subtle for most juries.  It is, in effect, misleading, and as the 
above passage suggests, intentionally so. 
F.  Closing Argument 
Properly presented evidence may become misleading due to its 
characterization in closing argument to the jury.  Williamson also 
exemplifies this issue.  In summation, the prosecutor claimed, “[T]here’s a 
 
 215. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted).  “The results 
thus completely undermined Ms. Gilchrist’s testimony.” Id. at 1064.  As the court noted, 
An expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the DNA testing performed by 
Agent Vick unquestionably eliminated Mr. Mitchell . . . .  This expert reviewed 
Ms. Gilchrist’s trial testimony . . . and stated that the testimony was based on the 
use of test methods Ms. Gilchrist knew were less precise than the DNA tests which 
eliminated Mr. Mitchell.  Moreover, he pointed out that one of the tests she 
performed in fact excluded Mr. Mitchell. 
Id.; see also Gilchrist v. Okla. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 94 P.3d 72, 75 (Okla. 2004) 
(“Gilchrist’s conduct in Mitchell, that is knowingly giving false and misleading testimony in 
a criminal case, constituted ‘misconduct’ sufficient to support the denial of unemployment 
benefits . . . .”). 
 216. G. Louis Joughin & Edmund M. Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti 15 
(1948); see also James E. Starrs, Once More unto the Breech:  The Firearms Evidence in the 
Sacco and Vanzetti Case Revisited (pts. 1 & 2), 31 J. Forensic Sci. 630 (1986), 31 J. Forensic 
Sci. 1050 (1986). 
 217. Joughin & Morgan, supra note 216, at 15. 
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match.”218  Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writing that 
the “[h]air evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent’s apartment.”219  
Using the term “match”—without further explication—is frequently 
confusing.220 
Similarly, in People v. Linscott221 the Illinois Supreme Court found that 
the prosecutor improperly argued that hairs collected from the victim’s 
apartment “were conclusively identified as coming from defendant’s head 
and pubic region.  There simply was no testimony at trial to support these 
statements.  In fact, [the prosecution experts] and the defense hair expert . . . 
testified that no such identification was possible.”222  Steven Paul Linscott 
was also subsequently exonerated by DNA evidence.223 
IV.  OBSERVATIONS AND REFORMS 
In the preceding sections, we made some specific recommendations 
regarding particular problems such as late and incomplete disclosure and 
inadequate or nonexistent lab reports.  Here we offer some observations and 
suggestions that apply broadly to all of the problems discussed above. 
A.  Effective Representation of the Public 
DNA exonerations have revealed that defense counsel in criminal cases 
involving scientific evidence often did not provide their clients with 
effective representation.  Perhaps because the prosecutor’s client is the 
government rather than an individual, we often fail to appreciate that the 
prosecutors in these cases also seriously fail in their ethical obligations to 
represent the government effectively.  Through the conviction of innocent 
persons, the consequent failure to convict the actual perpetrators, and the 
creation of cynicism toward the criminal justice system, prosecutors who 
misuse scientific evidence fail to serve the interests of the governments they 
represent as well as the public interest, and thus fail in their ethical 
obligations. 
 
 218. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (alteration in 
original). 
 219. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 220. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 36 (discussing misuse of the term “match” in the 
Central Park jogger case). 
 221. 566 N.E.2d 1355 (Ill. 1991). 
 222. Id. at 1359. 
 223. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 65 (“The State’s expert on the hair examination 
testified that only 1 in 4,500 persons would have consistent hairs when tested for 40 different 
characteristics.  He only tested between 8 and 12 characteristics, however, and could not 
remember which ones.  The appellate court ruled on July 29, 1987, that this testimony, 
coupled with the prosecution’s use of it at closing argument, constituted denial of a fair 
trial.” (citation omitted)). 
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B.  Need to Investigate Prosecutors’ Role 
The frequency and seriousness of prosecutorial misuse of scientific 
evidence suggest something is seriously wrong, not only with the experts 
who provide this evidence but also with the prosecutors who call those 
experts into criminal courtrooms.  Particularly troubling is the fact that 
some prosecutors have repeatedly used experts such as Fred Zain and Joyce 
Gilchrist, despite obvious warning signs of corruption. 
Why have prosecutors engaged in such behavior?  Why have they failed 
to detect or act to correct defective scientific evidence?224  One plausible 
answer is that prosecutors act this way simply because these experts, 
corrupt or not, help win convictions.  Certainly obtaining convictions is a 
powerful incentive for prosecutors.  But an explanation that focuses solely 
on the incentive to win a case seems unduly simplistic, failing to account 
for the complexity of the constellation of incentives operating on a 
prosecutor and the psychological dynamics of the prosecutor’s role.  
Prosecutors are subject to a number of incentives to avoid the use of corrupt 
scientific evidence, such as the desire not to convict the innocent and the 
desire to convict the guilty.  Self-interest also provides an incentive not to 
use corrupt evidence in order to avoid public embarrassment, damage to 
career, and implication in obstruction of justice. 
One possible explanation for prosecutorial use of junk scientific evidence 
is that prosecutors are simply not skilled enough in this area to provide a 
check on tainted experts.  But if, as noted above, pressure from prosecutors 
is a significant contributing cause of the introduction of corrupt scientific 
evidence, then something more malign than simple incompetence is at play 
in some cases.  Another possible explanation is that the psychological 
phenomenon of escalation of commitment may blind prosecutors to the 
possibility of a defendant’s innocence or an expert witness’s falsity. 
Many prosecutors undoubtedly adhere to their legal and ethical 
obligations regarding the selection, discovery, and presentation of expert 
witnesses and, in doing so, help protect our criminal justice system from 
perverse scientific evidence.  But a disturbingly high number of cases reveal 
prosecutors who fail to adhere to these obligations.  Unfortunately, we do 
not have much information about what percentage of prosecutors fall into 
this latter category.  Nor do we have good information about what is driving 
this misconduct when it occurs.  As Professor Bennett L. Gershman 
commented, 
 
 224. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions:  Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 399, 400 
(“[P]rosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three institutional conditions:  vague 
ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary authority 
with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, which 
create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, 
prosecutorial misconduct.”). 
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 The prosecutor’s misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict 
has not been sufficiently examined.  Courts and commentators critiquing 
abuses of scientific evidence in criminal cases rarely focus on the 
prosecutor’s role in the process.  Issues typically discussed are the 
questionable nature of the evidence, the controversial manner in which the 
evidence was acquired and tested, whether the expert arrived at her 
conclusions in a scientifically reliable manner, and whether the expert’s 
courtroom testimony was false or misleading.  The prosecutor’s control 
over and manipulation of the scientific evidence to shape the fact-finder’s 
evaluation of the facts and to persuade the fact-finder of the defendant’s 
guilt usually escapes scrutiny.225 
Investigation into prosecutorial involvement in the misuse of scientific 
evidence is an important step toward understanding and correcting such 
conduct. 
C.  Competence 
Perhaps the most basic of professional ethical obligations is competence.  
Indeed, it appears as the first of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:  
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”226  An 
accompanying comment explains that relevant factors in determining 
whether a lawyer acts competently include “the relative complexity and 
specialized nature of the matter.”227 
As its text indicates, questions of competence under Model Rule 1.1 can 
be broken down into issues of expertise and preparation.  The first—which 
the Rule refers to with the words “knowledge” and “skill”—deals with the 
capability of a lawyer to handle a particular representation.  The second—
which the Rule refers to with the words “thoroughness and preparation”—
deals with the time and effort the lawyer invests in preparing the case.  In 
other words, a lawyer may violate the duty of competence by lacking 
sufficient knowledge of or skill in a particular field, such as patent, tax, or 
divorce law.  Or, even if he has sufficient expertise, he may violate the duty 
of competence by failing to investigate and prepare the case sufficiently by, 
for example, failing to obtain sufficient information from the client, to 
interview witnesses, or to review documents provided in discovery. 
No attorney can competently try criminal cases today without a 
grounding in scientific evidence.  The ABA recently adopted the following 
recommendations:  (1) “Training in forensic science for attorneys should be 
made available at minimal cost to ensure adequate representation for both 
the public and defendants,” and (2) “Counsel should have competence in 
the relevant area or consult with those who do where forensic evidence is 
 
 225. Gershman, supra note 5, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 226. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2007). 
 227. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1. 
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essential in a case.”228  Familiarity with scientific evidence could be made 
part of the basic training for all new prosecutors.  Or a prosecutor’s office 
could train certain prosecutors in scientific evidence and assign them to 
cases involving experts or have them handle expert witnesses as part of a 
trial team. 
D.  Prosecutors in an Adversary System 
Our criminal justice system employs a series of measures aimed at 
controlling the quality of evidence used to support a conviction.  The 
quality control device most frequently highlighted in our adversary system 
is opposing counsel.229  Defense counsel’s role is to challenge and to reveal 
the weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence through cross-examination, 
presentation of counterproof, and drawing the fact-finder’s attention to the 
weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence in closing argument.  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence.”230 
Yet there is little question that defense counsel have often failed in 
controlling the quality of scientific proof,231 and the ABA recommendations 
cited in the previous section apply to defense attorneys as well as to 
prosecutors.  In addition, we have advocated comprehensive pretrial 
discovery in prior parts of this essay, recommendations that would go a 
long way in promoting effective representation.232  Moreover, a number of 
 
 228. Achieving Justice, supra note 169, at 47. 
 229. Another quality control mechanism is the fact-finder—either judge or jury—who is 
trusted with ultimate responsibility for sorting out what is false and what is true, using 
judgment and reasoning to assess what has been presented by the lawyers.  In a criminal 
case, the adversary system also relies on a high standard of proof—beyond reasonable 
doubt—as a quality control measure regarding prosecution evidence. 
 230. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
 231. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246.  Twenty-seven percent of the cases involved 
incompetent counsel. Id.; e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209–11 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding 
ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of a capital murder case due to counsel’s failure to 
present evidence of defendant’s mental retardation/neurological impairment, counsel’s 
acquiescence to prosecutor’s suggestion that the experts requested by defense be treated as 
court-appointed rather than defense experts, and counsel’s failure to challenge expert 
reports); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726–27 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding a failure to pursue 
an impotency defense in a rape case); United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (holding that a failure to consult handwriting expert made out a viable claim of 
ineffectiveness); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding a failure to 
have a quilt examined for gunshot residue). 
 232. “It is also clear that in case after case, defense counsel failed to review the case notes 
of the prosecution’s forensic serologists.  Even a layperson would have seen that Fred Zain’s 
written reports and sworn testimony were contradicted by his case notes.” Walter F. Rowe, 
Commentary, in Connors et al., supra note 15, at xv, xviii. 
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studies have demonstrated the recurrent failure to provide independent 
experts to the defense.233  This needs to be rectified. 
1.  Judge as Gatekeeper 
Both scholars and practitioners have expressed concern in recent years 
that the adversary system’s quality control mechanisms are insufficient to 
assure the reliability of scientific evidence.  One response to this concern 
has been the recognition of a “gatekeeping” role for trial judges.  Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.234 has been transformed from a case 
that most courts and commentators believed lowered the barriers to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence to one that the Court now describes as 
imposing an “exacting” standard.235  As gatekeepers, judges are charged 
with screening out scientific evidence deemed unreliable because of 
insufficient data, unsound scientific principles, or unsound application of 
sound principles.236  The trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility, it should 
be noted, supplements rather than replaces traditional adversarial quality 
control mechanisms such as cross-examination, counterproof, the fact-
finder’s judgment, and the standard of proof. 
However, the demanding standards of Daubert have yet to be fully 
implemented in criminal litigation.237  Courts, for example, continue to 
 
 233. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma:  The Right to Expert Assistance 
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 (2004) (discussing the need to 
bolster the accused’s right to defense experts). 
 234. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Court followed with General Electric Company v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to form what 
is now known as the Daubert trilogy. 
 235. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 236. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.  Indeed, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as 
inviting a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical fields.” United 
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (discussing handwriting comparison); 
see also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002).  The court 
noted, “Courts are now confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility 
had long been settled.” Id.  The court also noted that handwriting comparison is a well-
settled field that is now being reexamined. Id.  As a result, attacks have been launched 
against handwriting evidence, hair comparisons, fingerprint examinations, firearms 
identification, bite mark analysis, and intoxication testing.  While most of these challenges 
have been unsuccessful in terms of admissibility, they have exposed the lack of empirical 
support for many commonly employed forensic techniques. 
 237. One commentator noted that “the heightened standards of dependability imposed on 
expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the 
prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in pre-Daubert 
standards or approach.” D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability:  Are Criminal 
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 149 (2000).  An 
extensive study of the reported criminal cases found that “the Daubert decision did not 
impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial or the appellate court 
levels.” Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 339, 364 
(2002).  In contrast, a Rand Institute study of civil cases concluded that, “since Daubert, 
judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and have found more 
evidence unreliable as a result.” Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for 
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision 25 (2001). 
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admit comparative hair analysis.238  Consequently, one might question 
whether either the adversary system or the judiciary will adequately protect 
against the use of junk science by prosecutors. 
2.  The Prosecutor as Gatekeeper 
In this section, we suggest the recognition of a gatekeeping role for 
prosecutors when offering scientific evidence.  A possible mechanism for 
implementing such a role would be to modify Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.8, which governs the special responsibilities of the prosecutor.  
In sum, we suggest adding a provision that would make it an ethics 
violation for a prosecutor to knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offer 
defective scientific evidence. 
A different rule, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) (candor toward the tribunal) is 
currently the key ethics provision in all the contexts we discuss above—
selecting, preparing, and presenting expert testimony.  It provides, 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:  . . . 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a 
lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the 
lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to 
offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant 
in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false.239 
Before turning to a gatekeeping role for prosecutors regarding corrupt 
scientific evidence, it is worth noting a few salient features of this Model 
Rule.  First, it applies the same standard to prosecutors as it does to civil 
litigators and criminal defense lawyers.  In contrast, Model Rule 3.8 
articulates the distinct obligations of prosecutors.  But it does not address 
presentation of false evidence, by default leaving prosecutors covered by 
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3). 
Second, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) places a minimal obligation on 
prosecutors.  The prosecutor may introduce evidence unless she knows that 
it is false.  If the prosecutor suspects that evidence is false or even is aware 
of a substantial risk that the evidence is false, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) permits 
the prosecutor to introduce the evidence.  In other words, using Model 
 
 238. See, e.g., State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997) (“Because the scientific 
principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established and of 
proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as ‘technical knowledge.’  
Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary.”); McGrew v. State, 682 
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (concluding that hair comparison is more a matter of 
observation by persons with specialized knowledge than a matter of scientific principles); 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ky. 1999) (noting that evidence of hair 
analysis by microscopic comparison has been admissible in that jurisdiction for many years). 
 239. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007) (emphasis added). 
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Penal Code terminology, the prosecutor may introduce evidence if the 
prosecutor’s mental state regarding its falsity is one of innocence, 
negligence, or even recklessness.240  Only when the prosecutor’s mental 
state is “knowledge” does Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) impose a gatekeeping 
function and require the prosecutor not to offer the evidence.  A troubling 
aspect of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)’s use of knowledge as the triggering 
criterion is that it creates an incentive to avoid such knowledge in order to 
avoid the prohibition against offering false evidence.241  An interesting 
question is whether or not willful blindness on the part of a prosecutor 
constitutes knowledge under Model Rule 3.3 as it does in many criminal 
codes.242 
Why does an ethics rule condone a lawyer offering evidence when he or 
she is aware or should be aware of a serious risk that the evidence is false?  
The answer is that Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects an adversarial paradigm 
that assigns the task of quality control primarily to opposing counsel and 
the fact-finder rather than the lawyer offering the evidence.  Like many of 
our legal ethics rules, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is a mixed or blended rule, 
having both adversarial and cooperative aspects.  When the prosecutor has 
knowledge of falsity, she must act cooperatively and not introduce false 
evidence.  But when the prosecutor has a mental state less than knowledge, 
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects an adversarial conception of the prosecutor’s 
role regarding false evidence.243 
 
 240. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2001).  The Model Penal Code created four precisely 
defined mental states:  (1) purpose, (2) knowledge, (3) recklessness, and (4) negligence.  
Recklessness has a subjective component, requiring awareness of the risk. See Joshua 
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 10.07 (3d ed. 2001). 
 241. “If the attorney is prohibited only from offering false expertise when she knows it to 
be false, then ignorance is bliss for both the proffered expert and the attorney.” Saks, supra 
note 5, at 427. 
 242. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 27 (“The well-known criminal law doctrine known 
as ‘willful blindness’ should apply equally to a prosecutor who regularly uses a scientific 
expert who is notorious for incompetence and dishonesty.”). 
 243. Federal Rule of Evidence 601, dealing with the competence of witnesses, provides a 
useful comparison to Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) in terms of both favoring admissibility and 
reliance on the adversary system.  The common law prevented witnesses from testifying on 
bases such as a witness’s conviction of a crime and being a party to the litigation.  The 
thinking behind these exclusions was that a witness’s bad character and bias threaten the 
reliability of a witness’s testimony.  The modern approach reflected by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence does away entirely with these competence bans despite the fact that the Federal 
Rules still view character and bias as highly relevant to the assessment of witness credibility.  
Why, one might ask, does the modern view allow a biased witness or one with a prior 
perjury conviction to testify?  The response is not that the Federal Rules deny that character 
and bias raise reliability issues.  Rather, the idea here is that the task of monitoring witness 
reliability should be handled not by the judge as a gatekeeper enforcing categorical 
competence bans, but by opposing counsel wielding the tools of cross-examination and 
counterproof in addition to the fact-finder employing its judgment, its reasoning ability, and 
the standard of proof.  In other words, Rule 601, when compared to the common law of 
evidence that preceded it, reveals a shift of power and responsibility away from the judge as 
gatekeeper and toward opposing counsel and the fact-finder as primary monitors of witness 
reliability.  Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects similar reasoning regarding lawyers as gatekeepers 
of evidence. 
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What supports our proposal of creating a greater gatekeeping role for 
prosecutors regarding scientific evidence than the one reflected in Model 
Rule 3.3(a)(3)?  Our primary argument is that such a role is appropriate for 
prosecutors because the quality control mechanisms of the adversary system 
simply are not working in regard to scientific evidence due to lack of 
defense resources.  Thus, the minimal obligation set forth in Model Rule 
3.3(a)(3) needs to be heightened.  Moreover, the cooperative role of 
gatekeeper is consistent with and required by the distinct role and 
responsibilities of a prosecutor. 
Criminal defendants and their lawyers routinely lack the resources to 
effectively cross-examine a prosecution expert, to present competing 
scientific counterproof, or to point out weaknesses in that expert’s 
testimony to the fact-finder in closing argument.  The lack of an effective 
challenge by opposing counsel has the practical impact of nullifying the 
fact-finder’s ability to distinguish corrupt from valid scientific evidence.  
Close examination of criminal cases has revealed what is often in effect an 
ex parte presentation of scientific evidence by the prosecution.  The 
defendant and defense counsel are physically present during the 
presentation of the evidence, but cannot participate in anything other than a 
pro forma fashion due to lack of access to the scientific expertise necessary 
for cross-examination, presentation of counterproof, and addressing 
evidentiary weaknesses in closing argument. 
Investigation of the misuse of scientific evidence, sparked largely by the 
advent of DNA evidence, has revealed not only that the defense lawyer’s 
and fact-finder’s ability to monitor the quality of scientific evidence has 
been seriously compromised, but also that the lack of adversarial challenge 
has had a corrupting influence on the experts themselves.  How could an 
expert such as Fred Zain repeatedly falsify serology tests if there was 
effective cross-examination and counterproof from the defense?  How 
would he muster the audacity to repeatedly falsify evidence if he was not 
confident that the supposedly adversarial criminal justice system in which 
he operated presented no realistic threat that his falsification would be 
revealed? 
Lawyer ethics rules uniformly recognize a cooperative standard when a 
lawyer makes an ex parte presentation to a fact-finder because the quality 
control mechanisms of the adversary system are lacking.  Model Rule 
3.3(d), for example, requires that a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding present 
all material information to the fact-finder, not just what is favorable to his 
client as the adversary system would dictate.  Comment 14 to Model Rule 
3.3 states the obvious reasoning behind this cooperative standard:  “[T]here 
is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates.”244  Thus, the lawyer 
must reveal all facts he “reasonably believes are necessary to [support] an 
informed decision.”245 
 
 244. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 cmt. 14 (2007). 
 245. Id. 
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This cooperative ex parte standard often applies to prosecutors.  For 
example, it requires a prosecutor applying for a search warrant or a court 
order authorizing a wiretap to make a complete and candid presentation of 
the facts.  The judge in an ex parte context also has an obligation to act 
differently than she would in a setting in which both parties participate.  As 
pointed out above, although the presentation of scientific evidence takes 
place in a setting that appears adversarial, in reality it functions as an ex 
parte presentation to the fact-finder. 
How might such a cooperative standard be created?  One possibility 
would be to add a new subsection to Model Rule 3.8 to recognize a 
gatekeeper role for prosecutors regarding scientific evidence that would 
state, “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:  . . . (g) refrain from 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offering false scientific evidence.” 
Instead of allowing the presentation of scientific evidence unless the 
prosecutor knows it is false, as current Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) does, our 
proposal would bar a prosecutor from offering scientific evidence unless 
she knows it is sound.  This would create an affirmative obligation on the 
part of the prosecutor to take reasonable steps to assure the soundness of the 
scientific evidence she offers.246  Such an obligation is consistent with the 
ethical duty of competence, since a negligent prosecutor is not acting 
competently.  Alternatively, a rule could be cast as imposing on the 
prosecutor a duty to assure that she has a good faith and reasonable basis 
for believing in the soundness of scientific evidence she offers, analogous 
to the duty to refrain from filing charges without probable cause or the civil 
litigator’s obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.247  Such a 
rule could be phrased as follows: 
 
 246. Professor Jane Campbell Moriarty has recently proposed amending Model Rule 3.8 
to prohibit the use of unreliable evidence:  “The Prosecutor in a criminal case shall:  make 
reasonable efforts to assure that only reliable expert evidence is admitted into evidence.  A 
prosecutor shall not use evidence that she knows or reasonably should know is unreliable.” 
Moriarty, supra note 5, at 28.  She names hair evidence as a type of evidence that would be 
targeted by this proposal. Id. at 29.  Professor Michael J. Saks cites handwriting. Saks, supra 
note 5, at 428.  The weak scientific bases of hair analysis and some other forensic techniques 
have concealed expert misconduct in many cases.  Yet, as long as courts admit these types of 
evidence—the overwhelming majority do—what is or is not reliable is subject to debate.  It 
would be difficult to fault a prosecutor who used such evidence carefully—that is, ensuring 
that the jury understood its limitations.  The argument over hair evidence may be academic, 
because mitochondrial DNA will probably replace it as the method of choice. See Max M. 
Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair 
Comparisons, 47 J. Forensic Sci. 964, 966 (2002) (“Of the 80 hairs that were 
microscopically associated, nine comparisons were excluded by mtDNA analysis.”); see also 
Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence by 
Prosecutors:  Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1453, 1472 (2007) 
(“Although it has become widely available only in the last few years, mtDNA analysis has 
nonetheless proven an effective and highly reliable technique to definitively exclude (or 
include) an individual as the person who deposited one or more hairs at a crime scene.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 247. Another analogous requirement is the one imposed on lawyers during cross-
examination of a good faith basis for asking an impeaching question that implies the 
existence of an impeaching fact. See, e.g., Ohio R. Evid. 607(B) (“A questioner must have a 
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A prosecutor shall not offer scientific evidence unless she has a good faith 
and reasonable belief that the evidence (1) is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) is the 
product of reliable application of such principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.248 
CONCLUSION 
This essay examines a number of recurring problems associated with the 
prosecution’s use of experts:  selection of experts, compliance with 
discovery obligations, and presentation of testimony at trial.  Each presents 
different issues.  As for pretrial disclosure, amending discovery rules to 
require full disclosure of expert testimony, including documentation for 
each test and specifying the content of laboratory reports, would obviate 
most problems.  Imposing discovery sanctions for late disclosure would 
also help. 
Full discovery would also reduce, though not eliminate, problems with 
the presentation of expert testimony.  Requiring laboratory reports to 
specify the limitations of the technique and including a statement to the jury 
explaining the significance of the findings would aid defense counsel and 
judges as well as the jury.  The selection of experts presents a far more 
difficult issue.  Yet prosecutors cannot be given a free pass.  There should 
be both a due process and an ethical obligation on prosecutors to scrutinize 
“controversial” experts more thoroughly than some currently do. 
Given the special responsibilities of prosecutors as ministers of justice 
and the lack of defense access to expert resources, we propose a 
gatekeeping role for prosecutors regarding scientific evidence.  In sum, we 
suggest adding a provision to Model Rule 3.8 that would make it an ethics 
 
reasonable basis for asking any question pertaining to impeachment that implies the 
existence of an impeaching fact.”). 
 248. One way to qualify a gatekeeping obligation for the prosecutor might be to 
distinguish among the various categories found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  Rule 702 
essentially codifies the Daubert and Kumho cases and recognizes the trial judge’s role as a 
gatekeeper regarding scientific evidence.  Rule 702 recognizes three distinct prerequisites for 
admission of scientific evidence for the trial judge to monitor:  (1) sufficiency of data, (2) 
reliability of principles and methods, and (3) reliable application to facts.  Some 
commentators have argued that recognizing a gatekeeping role for lawyers would be too 
onerous since the principles and methods of science are often uncertain and in a state of flux.  
To address this problem, a new ethics rule for prosecutors might distinguish among the 
various categories recognized by Rule 702, imposing a more demanding affirmative duty 
regarding categories (1) and (3) and a less demanding duty regarding category (2).  In a case 
involving serology, for example, the prosecutor would need to satisfy herself that the expert 
had in fact performed the tests he claims to have conducted and performed them in a way 
that minimizes the risk of corruption, such as blind testing.  The prosecutor might satisfy this 
obligation in a number of ways.  The prosecutor’s office might insist on periodic auditing by 
outside experts and other measures aimed at reducing the risk of corruption.  The prosecutor 
could also refrain from offering evidence provided by experts whose work has been revealed 
as lacking in reliability in earlier cases or when other circumstantial evidence raises a 
question of reliability. 
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violation for a prosecutor to knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offer 
defective scientific evidence. 
 
